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INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW: THE 
REGULATION OF HOW MARKET-MOVING 
INFORMATION IS REVEALED 
[101 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2016) (FORTHCOMING)] 
 
Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson† 
Corporate information that moves stock-market prices 
sits at the center of modern securities regulation.  The Great 
Depression-era securities laws at the foundation of the field 
require much mandatory disclosure of this type of 
information.  They also include a strict anti-fraud regime to 
ensure the credibility of those disclosures of that 
information.  And for a half century now, that regime has 
been interpreted to prohibit insiders from trading on the 
same information. 
Today, a new body of securities law is emerging on top 
of this regulatory structure built around corporate 
information.  That body—which we call 
“information-dissemination law” (IDL)—focuses on how 
important information is revealed to the market.  The current 
defining feature of IDL is found in requirements that such 
information must be disseminated to all investors at the 
same exact time in the name of ordinary-investor fairness.  
Yet, using a market-microstructure-based understanding of 
securities markets, our analysis shows that the ordinary-
investor benefits of such equal-timing efforts are far from 
clear.  Indeed, it shows that simultaneity is perversely 
harming the most vulnerable ordinary investors.  
Accordingly, the Article defines this nascent area of law, 
subjects its fairness rhetoric to economic realities, and 
explores ways in which it might be reformed to further its 
primary stated goal or those of the field more generally—or 
even better, both. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, regulators have repeatedly 
decreed that they would end what was quickly becoming a 
routine practice: the release of market-moving information to 
some investors just prior to the time at which it was being 
made available to the entire public.  The most prominent 
examples of regulatory efforts in the area during this period 
involved the New York State Attorney General (NYAG) and the 
University of Michigan.  Michigan had been releasing 
bimonthly revisions to its Index of Consumer Sentiment to 
high-speed traders just seconds before making them widely 
available.  The famous index contains valuable information 
on consumers’ views on the direction of the economy.  For 
that reason, media and information giant Thomson Reuters 
agreed to pay Michigan over $1 million in return for the right 
to be the exclusive disseminator of index updates in 2014.1  
Pursuant their contract, Thomson then released index 
revisions to paying customers before making them widely 
available to the public.  Thus, Thomson was earning revenues 
in return for providing early access to new market-moving 
information to those who valued it. 
Whether to benefit the robustness of research or that of 
the football team, there is no doubt that Michigan could have 
legally traded on its work product two seconds, hours, days, 
weeks, or months before releasing it to the public.  Thomson 
could have done the same unless the parties’ contract 
provided a basis for concluding otherwise.  But these obvious 
legal conclusions did not stop the top state-level cop of Wall 
 
 1 See Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early Peeks at Key 
Index, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 7, 2013, 9:06 p.m.), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/thomson-reuters-to-suspend-early-
peeks-at-key-index/ [https://perma.cc/XRZ 4-NUVC]. 
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Street from declaring the early-release practice and 1,200 or 
so similar ones to constitute “Insider Trading 2.0,” and 
putting an end to them after investigations that resulted in 
cease and desist agreements.2 
This recent initiative (as well as another prominent one 
by the SEC)3 is not an isolated incident.  For just over a 
decade and a half, the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(commonly known as “Reg FD”) has required public 
companies to make material information available to all 
investors at the same exact time when first disseminating it 
beyond the firm.  But the issue of informational parity, a 
central concern of the SEC since the New Deal, is broader 
than these examples.  The SEC continues to be engaged in a 
years-long review of a controversial practice whereby trading 
firms “co-locate” their computer servers next to the servers 
that run securities exchanges.  The proximity between servers 
allows those firms’ algorithms to learn of trading activity at 
exchanges milliseconds before others.  The agency is also 
undergoing a review of a similar issue involving that same 
trading-activity information, albeit one that centers on 
distinct brief time lags: the ones between the time at which 
paying subscribers (whether they co-locate or not) receive the 
information and that at which the public receives it.  
 
 2 See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Marketwired Agreement to End Sales 
of News Feeds to High-Frequency Traders, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Mar. 19, 
2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-
marketwired-agreement-end-sales-news-feeds-high-frequency 
[https://perma.cc/3784-NZEF] [hereinafter Schneiderman Announces]; A.G. 
Schneiderman Secures Agreement by Thomson Reuters to Stop Offering Early 
Access to Market-Moving Information, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-agreement-
thomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-access-market [https://perma.cc/9Q2V-
BW84] [hereinafter Schneiderman Agrees].  In the former press release, 
Schneiderman stated that the accord was “part of . . . [his] efforts to end Insider 
Trading 2.0—the practice of providing preferred, technologically sophisticated 
traders with early access to market-moving information.”  Schneiderman 
Announces, supra note 2.  We know of no entity offering these types of early 
releases after the publicized investigations that ended in the two agreements 
and press releases cited in this note. 
 3 Another prominent recent initiative relates to the early release of 
public-company securities disclosures.  In November 2014, academic 
researchers, the Wall Street Journal, and Congress (in that order) noted that 
some investors were accessing those filings from the SEC’s website or an SEC 
information-dissemination contractor, or both, in the seconds and sometimes 
even minutes before they were first posted on the SEC’s website.  Prodded by 
Congress, the agency found itself working to ensure the simultaneous revelation 
of these market-moving disclosures. 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 105 
Additional behind-the-scenes pressures for equal timing 
relating to market-moving information undoubtedly exist. 
These examples of initiatives to regulate how and when 
market-moving information is disseminated to the public are 
not simply political stunts.  Rather, they appear to be 
genuinely aimed at a primary goal that is familiar: making the 
stock market fairer for ordinary, long-term investors.  
Banning sophisticated market participants from obtaining 
early access to information, the argument goes, reduces the 
asymmetry in valuable information known by pros versus 
that known by ordinary Joes—thereby making participation 
in the stock market fairer for the latter.  The initiatives thus 
embody a sacred tenet relating to all these individuals who (in 
the aggregate) supply so much of the capital that fuels the 
economy’s largest producers.  The tenet is that ordinary 
investors should, within reason, be put on as level of a 
playing field as possible with sophisticated speculators when 
it comes to the ability to make a profit in securities markets.4 
None of the above should surprise us.  With regard to the 
market forces, it is clear that there are benefits to being 
among the first who are able to obtain, analyze, and trade on 
information that will lead to changes in market prices.  That 
demand, in turn, triggers supply, as there is thus revenue to 
be garnered by providing market participants with early 
access to that information.  And with regard to the regulatory 
action, the mandatory-disclosure, securities-fraud, and 
insider-trading law that make up the core of modern 
securities regulation are motivated in large part by a desire 
among policymakers to reduce these types of information 
asymmetries. 
Against this background, this Article provides something 
that the literature has failed to consider with respect to these 
early release practices and the legal effort to stop them: a 
market-microstructure-based5 examination of how 
 
 4 The main ultimate aim of this enhanced fairness appears to be twofold.  
First, to ensure a specific instance of fairness: that a core American social 
institution (the stock market) is fair.  And second, to encourage investment in 
the companies that produce so much of the country’s goods and services, 
thereby—among other things—lowering their cost of capital and, in turn, it is 
hoped, the costs of those goods and services. 
 5 Market microstructure is a branch of economics that studies the forces 
at play between buyers and sellers in markets.  The principles of the field apply 
beyond sophisticated markets for the trading of financial instruments.  But they 
are mainly applied to those markets—if for no other reason than that relating to 
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information revelation is regulated.  In so doing, it makes 
three main important points. 
First, we establish that, taken together, Reg FD and 
regulatory action from the past few years can be viewed as 
representative of an emerging body of securities law.  To date, 
to the extent this area of law has been thought about at all, 
the inclination has been to treat it as an aspect of the 
mandatory-disclosure regime (as seen in Regulation Fair 
Disclosure) or insider-trading law (as demonstrated by the 
crack down on Insider Trading 2.0).  But we argue that the 
efforts described above are emblematic of a larger, nascent 
body of securities law that can be analytically severed from 
disclosure and trading rules.  We call this still emerging body 
of law “information-dissemination law” (IDL).  By IDL, we 
mean the set of rules that governs exactly when and how 
information that will be announced to the public is 
disseminated. 
Second, we argue that the basic fairness premise on 
which IDL is being built is unsound.  We show why 
policymakers have no basis for claiming that the main 
simultaneity-based examples of IDL are enhancing 
ordinary-investor wellbeing.  In fact, our analysis reveals that 
efforts to make securities markets fairer for ordinary-investor 
trading may be in fact doing the opposite, as at least the 
many individuals who trade directly through retail-level 
brokerage houses are likely made worse off by IDL today.  We 
also show how some IDL efforts, like those of the NYAG, harm 
ordinary investors on the whole. 
Third, our review shows that policymakers should think 
about crafting IDL that entails far more than basic 
simultaneous-dissemination requirements.  By so doing, the 
law could better achieve the current primary stated policy 
ends of IDL, while also potentially better furthering the other 
main end of modern securities law more generally—
enhancing stock-price accuracy.  To support these points, we 
offer concrete IDL proposals that would enhance ordinary-
investor wellbeing and a broader conclusion as to how they 
might be used in conjunction with another reform to IDL to 
improve both fairness and price accuracy at the same time. 
 
the availability of enormous amounts of data relating to those markets.  For a 
seminal treatise on market microstructure authored by a former chief 
economist of the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & 
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 6 (2003). 
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To see the main insight of this Article, consider Reg FD, 
the centerpiece of IDL.  Reg FD has two distinct, and 
opposite, effects on ordinary investors that have been 
overlooked in the securities-law literature.  The regulation 
prohibits firms from engaging in the once-common practice in 
which they reveal new information to selective audiences 
hours, days, or even weeks before announcing it to the entire 
public.  For that reason, throughout sustained periods 
leading up to the release of new corporate information, it 
reduces the risk that some select group of traders will have 
superior information that others lack.  The end result is that 
the wellbeing of ordinary investors who trade in these 
relatively long pre-release periods is improved.  However, that 
welfare improvement is only slight as a general matter 
because the ratio of informed trading to all other trading 
during these periods would generally have likely been quite 
low for most publicly traded stocks.6  Ultimately, then, Reg 
FD improves ordinary-investor wellbeing during those 
prolonged pre-release periods—but only slightly so because 
the information asymmetries it eliminates would generally 
have only imposed a slight negative effect on each member of 
the enormous herd of ordinary investors in the market during 
those periods. 
But, in brief post-release periods, Reg FD does something 
very different: it dramatically increases and concentrates this 
same information asymmetry.  In the seconds after new 
information is made publicly available, those who want to 
capture a trading profit based on this information must trade 
on it immediately, lest the competition beats them to the 
punch.  Ordinary investors who trade in this period are made 
markedly worse off as the execution of their orders to buy 
and sell stock are far more likely to be affected by better-
informed pros in those periods than they would be without 
the legal intervention. 
Stepping back, it becomes clear that the issue of whether 
 
 6 As we explain in the Article, in normal times, trading is dominated by the 
vast universe of savers who enter and exit positions in order to amass a 
diversified portfolio of stocks, balance that portfolio, or liquidate it in whole or 
part so that they can use their capital for consumption purposes.  When tiered 
dissemination takes place over the course of hours, days, or weeks, better-
informed traders aim to complete their trading without tipping off the rest of the 
market throughout those relatively long early-advantage windows.  Thus, their 
trading would likely be composed of a stretched out series of small trades 
throughout a tiered-release period that is still dominated by portfolio trading. 
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ordinary investors are helped or harmed by Reg FD’s 
simultaneity mandate depends mainly on whether the small 
gains from trading in the sustained pre-release periods that 
are slightly safer exceed the large losses from trading in 
shorter, now far more dangerous post-release periods.  No 
empirical study has aimed to quantify these gains and losses, 
and the SEC has not supported the rule with any analysis 
other than a plea to “fairness.”  Indeed, we know of no 
previous spotting of any of these issues whatsoever, as the 
law’s equal-opportunity approach appears to have precluded 
an open conversation about its true effects in the market.  
After all, who could come out against the equally timed 
dissemination of important information: this approach 
furthers the least objectionable type of fairness, since it 
focuses on opportunities, not outcomes—and it revolves 
around something our society holds sacred (valuable 
information). 
But, this is just the tip of the iceberg.  Reg FD, and the 
present simultaneity focus of IDL more generally, has two 
additional negative consequences.  The regulation gives 
ordinary investors reason to believe that they should be 
investing based on changes in firm-specific information (they 
shouldn’t) and are safe to engage in this trading in 
post-release windows (they aren’t).  The Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis and Modern Portfolio Theory 
demonstrate that ordinary investors can improve their 
returns for a given level of risk by buying and holding a 
diversified portfolio of stocks.  Yet by focusing on making 
information dissemination “fair,” the SEC implies that 
ordinary investors should be using information to inform 
stock trades, despite the proof that this is welfare-decreasing 
for those investors. 
Moreover, even if ordinary investors try to play the 
information-trading game, the overwhelming majority of 
them—if not all of them altogether—are hopelessly outgunned 
by professional investors.  Hedge funds, high-speed traders, 
and other industry pros trade in millisecond intervals using 
high-tech computer algorithms and specialty networks 
designed to reduce trading latency to levels unmatchable by 
the fastest ordinary investors.  Thus, even if it were a good 
idea for everyday investors to trade based on changes in 
information (and it isn’t), no reasonable regulation can level 
the playing field between an ordinary Jane with an e*Trade 
account and a high-speed trader.  IDL’s attempt to make 
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disclosure “fair” and the policymaker reasoning behind it 
simply do not hold up under close inspection. 
Our analysis also demonstrates that related reform 
efforts, such as that of the NYAG, are unambiguously bad for 
ordinary investors.  The prohibition on the early release of 
market-moving information (such as in the case of the 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index) does nothing more 
than move the costs associated with information asymmetry 
from a seconds-long period just prior to the public release of 
information to a similar one just after that release.  In the 
end, all the ban has accomplished is a deprivation of the 
ability of state universities and the like to earn revenue in 
return for their production of valuable information—while 
also, like Reg FD, leading the most vulnerable ordinary 
investors into value-destroying behavior along the way. 
Nevertheless, even if we are right about the ambiguous 
effect of Reg FD on ordinary investors, the perverse effect it 
has on the most vulnerable ordinary investors, and the 
negative effect the NYAG action has on both, IDL might still 
be sound policy for one of three reasons. 
First, fairness and wellbeing are two distinct concepts.  
Even if Reg FD and its more recent outgrowths now leave 
ordinary investors worse off, they may still be said to meet 
the definition of the former difficult-to-define and 
intellectually challenging term.  Although this surely has not 
been the SEC’s view of what constitutes fairness (nor ours), 
perhaps the world is a “fairer” place when Uncle Bob and 
Aunt Jane are on a more equal informational footing with 
Millennium Capital Management LP—no matter what impact 
that fairness has on the number at the bottom of their 401(k) 
statement. 
Second, perhaps actual fairness is not the true goal here.  
Regulators often speak of improving ordinary-investor 
confidence in the market in the same breath as improving 
ordinary-investor fairness.  If ordinary-investor perceptions of 
fairness result in those important market participants having 
higher levels of confidence in the market, it is possible that 
society should care more about perception than reality.  
Although knowingly indulging in incorrect assumptions about 
what the law does and does not do for ordinary investors may 
be undesirable (especially for a field like securities law that 
places much of its focus on deterring false or misleading 
statements), perhaps our analysis merely leads to the 
conclusion that the status quo should continue.  But if that 
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is the case, discussion of IDL in policymaking and scholarly 
circles should be open and honest about its approach. 
Lastly, Reg FD was also explicitly motivated by a concern 
about the integrity and competitiveness of the process in 
which information about public companies’ prospects become 
reflected in their stocks’ market prices.  Its equal-timing 
requirement for the release of corporate disclosures is 
thought to remove the incentive to corruptly provide firms 
with overly positive analysis in return for early access to their 
disclosures, thereby enhancing the integrity of that 
price-discovery process.  And that same requirement is also 
believed to increase the competiveness of the 
information-trading business, as anyone who has the ability 
and capital necessary to participate in the business can 
indeed do so without fear that he will be competing against 
other pros who were able to get an early start in the race to 
trade on new announcements.  These pricing benefits might 
justify even an unfair, intellectually dishonest IDL regime in 
which ordinary investors incur higher trading costs—
especially when those costs are amortized in a relatively even 
way across hundreds of millions of savers.  Notably, IDL for 
price-accuracy at the expense of fairness is not the stated 
approach of any simultaneous-dissemination effort today. 
But could IDL be reformed to better achieve its stated 
ends as well as those of securities regulation more broadly?  
With regard to the concern for ordinary-investor wellbeing 
alone, our analysis makes clear that there are a number of 
ways in which IDL could be changed to accomplish this end.  
For example, the law could add on to existing IDL to require 
the provision of notice to the market before releasing any 
potential market-moving information.  This notice, which we 
refer to as “disclosure of disclosure,” would allow ordinary 
investors—whose assembling, balancing, and liquidating of 
pieces of their diversified portfolios is generally not time 
sensitive—to avoid the dangerous trading environment that 
ensues after the release of such information.  Or, the law 
could tack another overlay on IDL: one that mandates set 
information-release periods with what we call 
information-dissemination shot clocks.  Firms and other 
information producers could be required to make any 
important releases of information in, for example, the first 
minute of each hour during the middle hours of the trading 
day.  So long as the timing and duration of these windows 
was made clear to the market, at least the savvy would know 
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to avoid engaging in non-time-sensitive portfolio trading 
around the top of each of those hours. 
Softer approaches are of course possible too.  Instead of 
devoting resources to policing the timing of disclosures, the 
SEC could aim to inform investors about the peril of trying to 
beat the pros.  Describing the stock market as including two 
distinct games—a game for professionals trading on 
information and a game for ordinary investors trading with an 
eye on a healthy risk premium—with separate rules of the 
game for each would be a nice start to such a campaign. 
But there is a serious downside to these types of reforms: 
they may reduce the incentive for sophisticated professionals 
to produce information about stock’s fundamental values, 
and impound it into market prices—thereby harming the 
other main goal of securities regulation (improving stock-
price accuracy).  By helping ordinary investors, each of the 
contemplated changes would take away trading profits from 
the professionals who analyze new information in order to 
spot underpriced or overpriced securities.  Given the 
long-standing theories as to the connection between higher 
levels of stock-price accuracy and the efficiency with which 
capital is allocated and quality under which corporations are 
governed,7 society would suffer. 
Here, then, is where the real work should begin.  Instead 
of superficial appeals to “fairness,” the SEC and academics 
should engage in a systematic analysis of the real impact of 
these rules on the various aspects of securities practice and 
policy.  Intriguing possibilities emerge.  For example, perhaps 
IDL should be reformed to allow firms to sell early-access 
rights to their disclosures in a well-regulated market for 
corporate disclosures.  Such an innovative approach may 
provide firms with the incentive to produce more robust 
disclosure products to meet market demand for them, while 
also leaving ordinary investors better off than they are today 
under existing IDL thanks to the addition of disclosure of 
disclosure or the like.  Price accuracy may be enhanced even 
if sophisticated speculators stand to make less.  After all, 
 
 7 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and 
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013–14 
(1984) (providing an overview of the social benefits of enhanced stock-price 
accuracy); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of “Inaccurate” 
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (providing another overview of the 
social benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy). 
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corporate information sits at the center of the modern 
securities regulation and its attempt to improve price 
accuracy, so improving disclosure of that information would 
surely, all else equal, improve price accuracy. 
Our analysis also opens the door for other interesting 
innovations for securities law.  For example, it suggests that 
the general ordinary-investor fairness concern that animates 
a good amount of legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial 
thinking on insider-trading law might be better addressed 
with, for example, set insider trading periods than the current 
porous enforcement regime.  So, it is safe to say that the 
building blocks we lay down here have import for not just 
IDL, but for securities law as a whole. 
The detailed version of the story unfolds as follows.  Part I 
identifies and describes IDL as an emerging area of securities 
law—animated primarily by the desire to promote 
ordinary-investor fairness, but also one to improve the quality 
of the price-discovery process.  Part II then provides an 
overview of four species of market participants, using 
principles from market microstructure to show how they 
interact in ways that implicate the design of any regulatory 
effort to increase ordinary-investor wellbeing.  Part III 
considers how these two parts interact, concluding that Reg 
FD affects ordinary investors ambiguously, that the NYAG’s 
recent action in the area harms ordinary investors, and that 
the SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative has an impact that falls 
somewhere between that of these two other initiatives (albeit 
closer to that of the NYAG’s one).  Part IV discusses these 
theory’s implications for IDL by thinking about how our 
reforms would enhance ordinary-investor wellbeing, but also 
whether that end is desirable in this context given likely 
trade-offs (namely, those relating to the accuracy of public 
companies’ stock prices).  Finally, the conclusion discusses 
why this Article’s analysis of how the revelation of new 
information is regulated opens the door for intriguing 
innovations for the field, including the one IDL reform alluded 
to above that could perhaps enhance both ordinary-investor 
fairness and stock-price accuracy. 
I 
AN EMERGING AREA OF SECURITIES REGULATION AND ITS PURPOSE 
Modern federal securities regulation is mostly about 
information (namely, material corporate information).  But it 
is composed of several interconnected, yet discrete parts.  The 
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main foundation comes in the form of the well-known 
mandatory-disclosure regime for public companies.  This 
regime, which dates to the early 1930s, is designed to ensure 
that these important players in the economy produce a wide 
variety of important information, and share it with outsiders.  
Sitting on top of the mandatory-disclosure regime are two 
main overlays: a far-ranging set of laws that prohibit fraud in 
connection with securities transactions8 as well as a number 
of doctrines to circumscribe trading by insiders.9  All of these 
laws are said to be designed to make markets fairer for 
ordinary investors10 as well as to help generate stock prices 
that better reflect firms’ fundamental values.11 
As we show in this Part, in recent years, another one of 
these distinct layers that sits on top of the mandatory-
disclosure regime has been forming: what we have labeled 
“information-dissemination law.”  IDL seeks to ensure that an 
ever-increasing range of market-moving information12 is made 
 
 8 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 17, 15 
U.S.C. § 77l; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 9 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2012); 
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 240–41 (1980) (interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit 
“fraudulent” trading on the basis of material, non-public information by 
corporate insiders); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (outlawing 
the deceitful misappropriation of material, non-public information for both 
insiders and outsiders); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (outlawing 
tipping-related behavior). 
 10 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 235–36, 1209–11, 1035–37, 
1039–42 (6th ed. 2015) 
 11 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, supra note 7, at 979 (footnote omitted) (noting 
that this “vast legal framework” is motivated “by one principal goal of securities 
laws: . . . creat[ing] stock markets in which the market price of a stock 
corresponds to its fundamental value.”). 
 12 Our primary focus is on market-moving information as opposed to 
material information.  Information “moves markets” when it results in changes 
to prices upon being learned by certain market participants.  Information is 
said to be material when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in deciding whether to purchase, hold, or 
sell.  See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  For 
many, the terms market-moving and material are interchangeable.  But it is 
worth noting that some market-moving information may not be of import to “a 
reasonable investor.”  For example, a large increase in the number of shares 
posted at the best (highest) bid prices in the market for IBM stock might move 
market prices up.  Yet information about that change is unlikely to be 
considered important to a reasonable investor.  Likewise, some material 
information may not move market prices.  For example, some surely consider 
information about corporate political spending to be material—even if particular 
political spending at issue is likely to have no impact on market prices 
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available to all investors at the same exact time when first 
being shared with the public.  Like mandatory-disclosure, 
securities-fraud, and insider-trading law, IDL is focused on 
ordinary-investor fairness.  In fact, to date, it has been 
primarily focused on fairness.  But like those more traditional 
areas of regulation in the securities area, at least the main 
example of IDL (Reg FD) also focuses on enhancing the 
accuracy of stocks’ prices.  In this Part, we discern this 
relatively new area of the law from the securities law that 
neighbors it by describing both rules and legal efforts that 
compose parts of IDL today, and then by providing an 
overview of these policy rationales that drive them. 
A. The Law 
The defining—indeed almost exclusive—attribute of IDL 
today is found in its various simultaneous-dissemination 
requirements.  The main equal-timing requirement of IDL is 
found in Reg FD.13  Promulgated in 2000, that SEC regulation 
bars public companies from making disclosures of material 
information in a non-simultaneous manner.14  Regulators 
have recently expanded on the regulation to cover some 
instances in which information was being provided to select 
groups of market participants shortly before it was being 
more widely released to the public.  We consider Reg FD and 
these recent related legal efforts in turn here. 
1. Reg FD 
Prior to 2000, firms often revealed information to favored 
investors or analysts before disseminating it to the market as 
a whole.15  But in that year, the SEC promulgated Reg FD, 
which ended this practice by requiring public companies to 
make their disclosures of material, not-yet-public information 
available to all potential investors at the same exact time.16 
 
whatsoever. 
 13 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-7881 , 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Reg FD Adopting 
Release]. 
 16 See § 243.100  (“Whenever . . . [a public firm] discloses any material 
nonpublic information regarding . . . [itself] or its securities . . . [, it] shall make 
public disclosure of that information . . . [s]imultaneously”); Reg FD Adopting 
Release, supra note 15, at 51,719 (“As a whole, the regulation requires that 
when an issuer makes an intentional disclosure of material nonpublic 
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Importantly, this simultaneous-dissemination 
requirement applies to the disclosure of all material corporate 
information—whether or not that disclosure was compelled 
by law in the first place.  So, firms must make everything 
from a mandated formal quarterly report with earnings 
information (a 10-Q), on the one hand, to a voluntary press 
release on the CEO’s asthma (which may or may not be 
required by the law), on the other, available to all members of 
the public at the exact same time. 
Firms can satisfy this equal-timing requirement in a 
variety of ways.  For example, they can meet it by providing 
their information in: a filing made with the SEC; a press 
release through a far-reaching public-relations service; a 
well-publicized conference call with broad call-in access; or 
even a posting on social media (including Twitter or 
Facebook).17  Any method that “is reasonably designed to 
effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information 
to the public” will do.18 
2. Recent Expansions 
Over the past few years, both the SEC and the most 
prominent state-level regulator of Wall Street have pursued 
initiatives to ensure the simultaneous dissemination of 
market-moving information in a broader way than that 
required under Reg FD. 
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative 
Public firms generally file their required disclosures with 
the SEC.  As such, the agency serves as a central repository 
for the well over 100,000 disclosures of corporate information 
that are made each year.19  Although companies are not 
required to make 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, Form 4s, Form 13Ds, 
and so on available to the public for the first time through 
this public-filing mechanism, they often do.  And that makes 
 
information . . . , it must do so in a manner that provides general public 
disclosure, rather than through a selective disclosure.”). 
 17 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,723–24. 
 18 Id. at 51,716. 
 19 See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang & Joshua Mitts, How Quickly 
Do Markets Learn? Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment 
9 (Apr. 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544128 [perma.cc/5HB
W-EHMH] (examining a data set of 42,619 filings by public companies in just a 
16-week period in middle of 2014). 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
116 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.101:PPP 
sense given that the SEC has expressly blessed public filing 
with it as a means of disclosure that comports with its 
equal-timing mandate.20 
As securities lawyers know all too well, the process in 
which these carefully reviewed statements are made available 
to the public by the SEC begins when they are uploaded by 
firms and their counsel to the back end of the agency’s 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
website.21  Less well known—at least until recently—is what 
happens behind the scenes between the time at which 
corporate disclosures are submitted to EDGAR, and that at 
which they become available on the front end of the SEC’s 
public EDGAR website.  In November 2014, an academic 
paper shined light on that process.22 
That academic study, along with another 
contemporaneous one,23 exposed what appears to be an 
embarrassing glitch in the handling of all types of disclosures 
in this time period between uploading and public availability.  
During that gap, the SEC contractors responsible for 
disseminating public filings in premium-quality formats were 
routinely distributing them to a handful of paying subscribers 
just moments after they were first uploaded to the SEC 
website, yet before they were posted publicly on it.24  At the 
median, it took about ten seconds longer for those filings to 
 
 20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 21 According to the SEC’s website, “EDGAR . . . performs automated 
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by 
companies and others who are required by law to file forms with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.”  Important 
Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/V6ZN-533C]. 
 22 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps 
Speedy Traders (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
501, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520105 
[perma.cc/5YTZ-JKXZ]. 
 23 See Jonathan L. Rogers, Douglas J. Skinner & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Run 
EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World (Chicago Booth 
Paper No. 14-36, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513350 [perma.cc/7K3L-
ET8Y]. 
  24 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 4; Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, 
supra note 23, at 17.  Forty or so clients subscribed to this feed, each paying 
about $15,000 annually for it.  See Ryan Tracy & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders 
Are Getting Data from SEC Seconds Early, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:18 
p.m.), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-traders-are-getting-data-from-sec-
seconds-early-1414539997 [https://perma.cc/XG2G-U86Q]; see also Jackson 
& Mitts, supra note 22, at app. A (showing that they paid approximately $1,500 
per month for the service). 
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be available on the SEC’s public website than through this 
feed.25  The disparity was apparently due to the time that it 
took the SEC to format and transfer uploaded files from that 
upload location over to the public website.26 
Given the well-publicized rise in high-speed trading, it 
should come as little surprise that some of the premium 
subscribers were traders who were profiting based on their 
seconds-early look at material information found in these 
disclosures.  Those intervals between the time at which the 
disclosures became available to them and the time at which 
they became available to the general public were 
characterized by abnormally high trading volume—and sharp 
price movements in the direction that the public disclosure 
would soon indicate to the market more generally.27 
In response, the SEC ironically found itself engaging in 
an effort to ensure that the disclosures that it requires firms 
themselves to make available to all investors at the same time 
were actually disseminated in that manner when filed 
“publicly” with the agency.  Indeed, soon after the academic 
works summarized here led to a Wall Street Journal article,28 
the Commission appeared to have imposed a delay on the 
premium-subscriber feed.  After that article, most filings on 
the feed went out only after they were first posted on 
EDGAR’s front-end website—meaning that the subscribers 
received the information after it was already in the public 
 
 25 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 1, 2, 8 (finding that the median 
early release was 10.3 seconds early); Rogers, Skinner, & Zechman, supra note 
23, at 28.  Interestingly, even after outliers were disregarded, lag times varied 
greatly.  Some feeds came a few seconds early, and others well over a minute.  
See Jackson, Jiang & Mitts supra note 19, at 19. 
 26 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 9.  The SEC itself was also 
making these filings available to investors moments before they were made 
public.  When disclosures were uploaded to EDGAR, they were immediately 
posted to an SEC file-transfer-protocol server.  See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 
22, at 4.  Any tech savvy investor who had access that server could access the 
disclosures on it.  At the median, those documents were not available on 
EDGAR’s front-end website until eleven seconds after they became available on 
the server.  Id. at 8.  However, because the early releases provided by 
subscription were accessible in a far more consistent and broader way than 
these early releases, we focus on the former. 
 27 See id. at 13; Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, supra note 23, at 2 (finding 
that “prices, volumes, and spreads move [in the direction of the news] 15–30 
seconds in advance of when the news is posted to the [public] SEC EDGAR 
site”). 
 28 See Scott Patterson, SEC to Close Gap in Filings’ Release, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 27–28, 2014, at B1. 
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domain.29  Thus, the SEC engaged in an initiative to stop a 
practice in which public-company disclosures were being 
disseminated to high-speed traders anywhere from a handful 
of minutes to a few seconds before they were first made 
available to the public. 
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action 
Corporate disclosures are not the only source of material 
information that is disclosed to the public.  Each year, an 
array of private and public entities likewise generates new 
information that moves markets, and makes it broadly 
available to the public.  Some of these entities that produce 
this valuable information—such as securities-analysis firms—
specifically gear their information production toward 
investors who are looking to buy underpriced securities and 
sell overpriced ones.  Others—such as universities, 
government agencies, and trade associations—primarily 
direct their generation of information toward furthering their 
own, non-securities-based ends. 
No matter what the primary motivation of its creator, 
there has traditionally been no bar on the tiered 
dissemination of this type of information.  After all, the 
production of this information has considerable benefits 
(namely, those arising out of more accurate stock prices)30—
and the ability to produce your own information about at 
least other entities and profit from trading on it yourself has 
long been unquestioned.  Nevertheless, last summer, New 
York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, the most 
prominent state-level regulator of Wall Street, put a halt to a 
practice in which entities were disseminating this type of 
information with unequal timing.31 
As you might imagine, in a world of high-speed trading, 
these types of early-release practices were becoming 
commonplace over the past few years.32  Perhaps thousands 
 
 29 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 14. 
 30 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
stock-price accuracy and the social benefits of more accurate stock prices); 
infra section I.B.1 (same). 
 31 See supra Introduction. 
 32 See, e.g., Brody Mullins, Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty & Jenny 
Strasburg, Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J., June 13, 
2013, at A1 (stating that “selling early access [to non-governmental, market-
moving information] is routine.”); Michael Rothfeld & Brody Mullins, Peeks Are 
Still Available for Some Key Economic Data, 
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of such informational work products were routinely being 
released early to speedy traders.33  More technically, the 
entities who were making these disclosures were selling the 
right to distribute them to news-related businesses or other 
information-dissemination services.  These intermediaries, in 
turn, would pass along the information to their clients before 
it was made available to the public—including by sending out 
a computer-readable early release specifically designed for 
high-speed traders.34  Thus, the sale of early-access rights 
was emerging as a not-insignificant business for both the 
entities that created this information as well as the 
intermediaries that purchased the right to disseminate it 
early. 
A salient example of both the information and types of 
early-release practices at issue is found in the dissemination 
of the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer 
Sentiment.35  Since just after World War II, the state 
university has produced this index that measures the 
sentiment of American consumers—assembling the work via 
nationwide telephone surveys that inquire into individuals’ 
views as to the current state of the economy.36  The end 
product that results from the surveys is widely thought to 
provide key insights into how much American consumers will 
spend in the near future.  And the amount that Americans 
will soon consume of course has serious implications for the 
 
WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013, 9:19 p.m.), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732486790457859411030977
8332 [https://perma.cc/3NHN-HF28] (“Many high-speed traders and hedge 
funds pay nongovernmental organizations for early access to economic reports 
and other data that often affect financial markets . . . .”). 
 33 See Grace Xing Hu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Early Peek Advantage? 8 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361311 
[https://perma.cc/4HJM-TFRG] (“Thomson Reuters[‘s] . . . low-latency news 
feed product . . . releases more than 1200 economic indicators in formats 
specially designed for algorithm trading.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 
141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that Thomson Reuters purchases the right to 
distribute information from various non-governmental sources, and that the 
company uses those rights to get high-speed feeds of that information in 
computer-readable forms to paying customers). 
 35 Other prominent examples include the information contained in the 
Chicago Business Barometer (a monthly index that measures economic activity 
based on surveys of Chicago-area businesses) and the manufacturing index 
produced by the Institute for Supply Management, an index “regarded by many 
as the single most important economic report coming from the private sector.”  
See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32. 
 36 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 7. 
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value of thousands upon thousands of securities.  As such, at 
around 10:00 a.m. on the second and fourth Fridays of each 
month when Michigan publicly releases revisions to its index, 
securities prices regularly change.37 
Although Michigan provided its twice-a-month index 
revisions via a conference call beginning at 9:55 a.m. and on 
its website soon after, these revisions reached many before 
then.38  The school, like so many other entities that fall far 
outside the scope of Reg FD’s public-company coverage, sold 
the exclusive right to disseminate its work product early to 
Thomson Reuters—garnering approximately $1.4 million in 
annual revenue in return.39  Thomson Reuters, in turn, used 
its early-distribution rights to sell its own feed of the results 
at 9:55 a.m. sharp as well as a premium release at exactly 
9:54:58 a.m.40  That premium release—going out just two 
seconds prior to the index’s broader 9:55 a.m. subscriber-
only and conference-call releases—came in the form of a 
computer-readable feed that was specifically designed for 
high-speed traders.41  Although anyone who paid the 
approximately $6,000-per-month subscription fee42 could 
receive that two-second advantage, the group of subscribers 
presumably consisted solely of the only traders that could 
obtain a time-based advantage in such a short period 
(high-speed ones). 
But, Attorney General Schneiderman began putting a 
 
 37 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he public release of . . . [the Michigan Index of 
Consumer Sentiment] can often move financial markets, in ways similar to the 
release of official government data such as GDP, inflation and unemployment 
numbers.”). 
 38 Id. at 7–8. 
 39 See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. (“Thomson Reuters’s marketing materials say the firm offers 
paying clients an ‘exclusive 2-second advanced feed of results . . . designed 
specifically for algorithmic trading.’” (ellipsis in original)); Hu et al., supra note 
33, at 7 (“The earliest wave of release happens at 9:54:58 a.m. . . . [EST], when 
Thomson Reuters sends out . . . [Index of Consumer Sentiment] numbers, in a 
specialized machine readable format, to a small group of fee-paying, high-speed 
clients.”). 
 42 See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32 (“Clients who 
pay a subscription fee to Thomson Reuters, which for some is $5,000 a month 
plus a $1,025 monthly connection charge, get the high-speed feed at 9:54:58 
a.m. Eastern time.”).  To follow up on the related examples from note 35, the 
Institute for Supply Management sells early access to its revised manufacturing 
indices via a high-speed service in return for about $3,000 per month, and the 
Chicago Business Barometer sells early access to its measure of local business 
activity for approximately $2,600 a year.  See id. 
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halt to these increasingly common practices in the summer of 
2013.43  The prosecutor did not bring formal charges against 
the University of Michigan, Thomson Reuters, or any of the 
legions of public and private entities that were providing 
these sneak peeks at information that they were making 
available to the public.  But the threat of prosecution—
perhaps along with the unwanted publicity of the 
investigation—was more than these entities were willing to 
bear.  To date, the practice in which this information was 
being disseminated to a select few before being made 
available to the public more generally appears to have gone 
the way of the pre-Reg FD selective release of corporate 
information—ending altogether since Schneiderman’s office 
entered into agreements with information-dissemination 
intermediaries in which those businesses agreed to cease and 
desist their tiered dissemination practices.44  In short, those 
in the information-dissemination business seem to have little 
interest in fighting City Hall in the New York State court 
system or in countering prosecutorial press releases in a 
broader public-relations war. 
B. The Policy Rationales Behind the Law 
As the name of the main aspect of IDL (Regulation “Fair” 
Disclosure) suggests, simultaneity efforts are primarily—
although not exclusively—driven by the desire to make 
securities markets fairer for ordinary investors.  This section 
summarizes this fairness rationale that drives the law in this 
area.  It also briefly introduces other important policy 
rationales behind Reg FD. 
1. Reg FD 
When released, the SEC justified Reg FD mainly on 
fairness grounds.  However, the agency also asserted two 
additional justifications.  One of these additional 
justifications is closely related to the fairness one, while the 
other is quite distinct.  But an understanding of all of these 
rationales is vital for understanding simultaneity’s actual 
impact on ordinary investors as well as our critique of the 
current form of IDL. 
 
 43 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 44 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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a. Making Securities Markets Fairer for Ordinary 
Investors 
First and foremost, the SEC promulgated Reg FD to make 
market participation fairer for the everyday individuals who 
invest directly or indirectly in the stock market.  When setting 
forth the regulation, the agency itself acknowledged that its 
new law was primarily aimed at this end.45  The agency 
thought that it was unfair to allow some market participants 
a head start in the race to process newly disclosed, material 
corporate information.  It therefore thought that the law 
should help investors by ensuring that they can trade on a 
level playing field with securities professionals when new 
information is being disclosed to the public. 
b. Boosting Investor Confidence in the Market 
Second, and relatedly, the SEC asserted that Reg FD was 
attractive because it would improve investor confidence in the 
market.  The Commission noted that it had received much 
support from individual investors for the 
simultaneous-dissemination requirement, and that this 
support gave rise to the inference that the requirement would 
increase their confidence in the stock market.46  The 
reasoning of the agency and the investors who supported 
action in this area seems to be straightforward: in a world in 
which firms can hand out information in a tiered manner, 
some investors (at least individual investors who transact 
directly through brokerage accounts) are at a structural 
informational disadvantage to some select group of 
professional traders.  Knowing that, those investors would 
have the perception that participating in the stock market 
 
 45 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-7787, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Reg FD 
Proposing Release] (stating that the main goal of Reg FD is to help increase 
“fundamental fairness to all investors.”).  The SEC emphasized that “the vast 
majority of . . . [those who submitted comment letters in response to the SEC’s 
Reg FD proposal] consisted of individual investors,” and that those investors 
urged the adoption of the regulation because non-simultaneous dissemination 
of corporate disclosures “places them at a severe disadvantage in the market.”  
Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,717. 
 46 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718 (“[T]he 
overwhelming support from investors for Regulation FD demonstrates a strong 
perception among the investing public that selective disclosure is a significant 
problem, and shows a corresponding need to prohibit this practice in order to 
bolster investor confidence in the fairness of the disclosure process.”). 
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involved playing an unfair game.47  They would downgrade 
their view of the integrity of the market—meaning that they 
would have less confidence in its ability to generate desirable 
results for them.  Therefore they might withdraw their 
investments or pay less for the investments they were willing 
to make.  Both of these would lead to undesirable results 
from a social welfare perspective.48 
c. Enhancing the Quality of the Price-Discovery Process 
Third, the Commission argued that this legal reform was 
well-reasoned policy for a very distinct reason: it would make 
the process in which corporate information is produced and 
impounded into stock prices more robust.49  This would lead 
to stock prices that better reflect firms’ fundamental values, 
which would in turn lead to better capital allocation and 
corporate governance.50 
The concept of how the simultaneous-dissemination 
requirement would make this process more robust is perhaps 
best understood by thinking about two ways in which that 
process is weakened by permitting disclosures to be released 
piecemeal.  First, in a world in which such tiered 
dissemination of corporate information is allowed, firms could 
choose which securities analysts would be the first to obtain 
the material information found in their disclosures.  Obvious 
conflicts of interest would result, and distortions in the 
quality of the analysis of that important information might 
therefore arise.51  Of particular concern, these market 
participants would be afraid to provide negative analysis of a 
firm, since any analyst who did so may quickly find itself 
losing favor with the firm the next time it selected the 
universe of market participants to which it would provide 
such valuable early looks.52 
 
 47 See id. at 51,716 (“We believe that the practice of selective disclosure 
leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.  
Investors who see a security’s price change dramatically and only later are given 
access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether 
they are on a level playing field with market insiders.”). 
 48 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718. 
 50 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
stock-price accuracy as well as the social benefits of more accurate prices). 
 51 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,717. 
 52 See id. at 51,716 (“Regulation FD is also designed to address . . . the 
potential for corporate management to treat material information as a 
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Second, in the world in which simultaneity is not 
required, some select group of securities analysts and 
professional traders has an exclusive on important 
information.  Knowing this, most—if not all—outside that 
group would be foolish to waste time engaging in the 
resource-intensive work of procuring, analyzing, and trading 
on the information in corporate disclosures.  Why engage in 
the competition to come in first in that information-based 
race if some select group of sophisticated competitors is able 
to set off before you?  As such, those outside the favored 
group will cease to compete—leaving only the selected group 
in the information-trading market.  With less competition in 
that market, the amount and quality of analysis may suffer—
and then the amount and quality of information contained in 
stock prices would too.53 
In the end, then, in one or both of these ways, permitting 
disclosures to be disseminated in a non-simultaneous 
fashion, the SEC asserted, would reduce the quality of the 
process in which information about firms’ prospects is 
produced, analyzed, and incorporated into stock prices—
thereby evoking a closely related larger concern in the field54 
for accurate stock pricing and the social benefits associated 
with it. 
2. Recent Expansions 
Fairness is also the main driving force behind the recent 
varied, yet related, efforts geared at ensuring the 
simultaneous dissemination of valuable information. 
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative 
The rationale behind the SEC’s corrective action to stop 
the early release of EDGAR filings was predictable.  As 
lawmakers’ cries indicated, ordinary-investor fairness 
compelled an end to the non-simultaneous dissemination of 
 
commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or 
investors.”); id. at 51,717 (“[I]n the absence of a prohibition on selective 
disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or 
otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively 
disclosed information.”). 
 53 For a discussion of the connection between Reg FD and level of 
competition in the securities-analysis market, see generally Zohar Goshen & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property 
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001). 
 54 See supra note 7. 
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those filings by the SEC and its contractors.55 
According to the SEC, EDGAR’s “primary purpose is to 
increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities market 
for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by 
accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and 
analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the 
agency.”56  Moreover, upon learning of the early releases, the 
top members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, promptly wrote the head of the SEC, 
noting that SEC “rules have laid the foundations for some of 
the . . . concerns about fairness,” and that “the assertions of 
preferred access to EDGAR filings via the SEC’s 
systems . . . give credence to th[ose] apprehensions.”57  In 
responding to the senate committee, the SEC predictably 
emphasized that it was “working to help ensure that the 
equity markets remain the deepest and fairest in the world.”58 
Members of the House of Representatives struck a similar 
tone in response to learning of the SEC’s apparently 
inadvertent tiered-dissemination practices.  Representative 
Carolyn Maloney, representing both the House Financial 
Services Committee and the Upper East Side of Manhattan, 
posted a press release entitled Maloney Calls on SEC to End 
Outrageous Policy That Allows Inside Investors Early Access to 
Public Filings.59  That release quotes the congresswoman as 
saying the following: “It is extremely distressing that insiders 
have been getting an early look at public filings for so long.”60  
The release also added that this non-simultaneous 
dissemination of corporate filings “violates the basic 
principles of fairness that underpin our markets,” and 
“urge[d] the SEC to put a stop to this as soon as possible.”61 
Even University of Chicago economists seemed to 
 
 55 See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. 
 56 Important Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/V6ZN-533C] 
(Feb. 16, 2010). 
 57 Letter from Senators Tim Johnson and Mike Crapo to SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White (Dec. 8, 2014) (on file with authors). 
 58 Letter from SEC Chair Mary Jo White to Senators Johnson and Crapo 
(Dec. 23, 2014) (on file with the authors). 
 59 Maloney Calls on SEC to End Outrageous Policy that Allows Inside 
Investors Early Access to Public Filings, CAROLYN B. MALONEY (Oct. 28, 2014), 
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-calls-on-sec-
to-end-outrageous-policy-that-allows-inside [https://perma.cc/U8NB-PN6A]. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. 
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question the fairness, noting in a paper co-authored with a 
University of Colorado economist that these early-release 
practices raise questions about whether the SEC 
dissemination process is really a level playing field for all 
investors.62 
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action 
The Attorney General likewise primarily cited ordinary-
investor fairness concerns in putting the kibosh on practices 
in which high-speed traders were receiving seconds-early 
access to market-moving information.  In announcing his 
office’s agreement with Thomson Reuters, Attorney General 
Eric Schneiderman stated that a “two second advantage is 
more than enough time for . . . [high-frequency] traders to 
take unfair advantage of their early access to this 
information.”63  That same announcement added that 
“[p]romoting fairness and avoiding distortions in the 
securities markets is an important focus of this office” and 
that “the early release of market-moving survey data 
undermines fair play in the markets.”64  Moreover, the 
announcement added that the agreement “sends a message 
that unfair timing advantages for high-frequency traders and 
others will not be tolerated by the Attorney General.”65 
* * * 
This initial Part has provided an overview of the defining 
feature of a growing area of regulation that we have termed 
“information-dissemination law:” requirements that 
market-moving information be revealed to the market 
simultaneously.  Although not its only end, primarily in the 
name of fairness, the main example of IDL (Reg FD) requires 
the information that sits at the center of modern securities 
regulation (material corporate information) to be made 
available to all members of the public at the same exact time 
when it is first disseminated beyond the firm.  And the related 
efforts discussed here likewise call for the equally timed 
dissemination of a wide variety of other valuable information 
in furtherance of that same end alone. 
II 
 
 62 See Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, supra note 23, at 4. 
 63 See Schneiderman Agrees, supra note 2. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (emphasis added). 
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A MODEL OF KEY ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET 
In this Part, we set forth a well-established model of key 
aspects of the American stock market.  Focusing on distinct 
types of traders in the stock market as well as the 
information asymmetries between them that results in 
ordinary investors incurring costs, that model provides the 
background necessary to understand both our critique of 
IDL’s simultaneous-dissemination requirement in Part III as 
well as our contemplated reforms to IDL in Part IV.  More 
specifically, the model describes the distinct characteristics of 
information traders, portfolio traders, noise traders, and 
professional-liquidity-providing traders—and presents one 
clear indication of the well-established 
asymmetric-information costs (AI costs) that ordinary 
investors incur as result of interactions between, on the one 
hand, information traders and, on the other, professional 
liquidity providers and portfolio traders.66 
A. Four Main Types of Traders67 
All individuals and entities buying and selling stocks are 
in search of financial gain.  Yet one can nevertheless break 
down these market participants into the four groups 
introduced above based on the unique types of financial 
motivations and strategies that animate their trading. 
1. Information Traders 
Information traders generally purchase and sell stocks 
based on information as to companies’ fundamental values 
 
 66 Here and throughout much of the paper, we predominantly focus on the 
parties that are buying and selling stock (traders) rather than on the often 
distinct ultimate beneficiaries of their trading (investors).  We do so because 
IDL’s effects fall on the former in the first instance.  For example, we focus on 
information traders (e.g., hedge funds) that are buying and selling stock based 
on information rather than on the investors (e.g., wealthy individuals) whose 
money those traders are investing, or on portfolio traders (e.g., index-based 
mutual funds) rather than the investors (e.g., retirement savers) whose money 
those traders are investing. 
 67 Our four-type model of traders is based on common models found in 
works in the area of market-microstructure economics.  See, e.g., HARRIS, supra 
note 5 (providing a model along these lines, albeit with additional detail and 
sub-categories unnecessary for present purposes).  Models similar to the one we 
present here have also appeared in the legal literature.  See Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 53; Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the 
Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121 
(2015). 
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that is not yet reflected in market prices.68  Competing as an 
information trader today requires exceedingly high levels of 
expertise and technological prowess.  Sources of 
market-moving information, such as corporate disclosures, 
are often complex.  Analyzing their import in the context of 
vast and ever changing firm-specific and market-wide 
information is even more complex.  And beyond these 
analytical challenges lies what is sometimes the most 
complex part: capturing trading profits based on information 
that often depreciates at incredible speeds.69  Thus, to 
compete in this game, one must have considerable resources, 
including access to first-rate analysis and state-of-the-art 
trade-execution systems. 
The challenge relating to execution speed calls for 
emphasis.  Today, the value of some types of market-moving 
information—such as that found in at least data-based public 
news announcements—often loses its value in literally less 
than the blink of an eye.70  It is for this reason that 
information traders spend enormous sums not only on 
obtaining and processing information, but also on executing 
trades at ever shortening latencies.71  Indeed, even when 
information-dissemination practices such as the 
seconds-early ones targeted by New York’s Attorney General 
and the SEC are eliminated, the information is still released 
by the Bloombergs and Thomson Reuters of the world in 
computer-readable form to those who pay for it—albeit at the 
same exact time as the information is made available in more 
 
 68 But see infra note 73 (providing a brief overview of the main exception to 
this general statement: information traders that profitably buy and sell based 
on short-term market movements that do not reflect the actual consensus 
import of fundamental-value information). 
 69 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 70 See, e.g., Hu et al., supra note 33, at 3–4 (finding that the new 
information contained in a key economic indicator (the Michigan consumer-
sentiment survey discussed earlier) became incorporated into securities prices 
within 200 milliseconds of its release).  An eye blink lasts about 100–400 
milliseconds.  See Daniel Ramot, BioNumber Details Page, BIONUMBERS (June 
11, 2013, 6:35 a.m.), 
http://bionumbers.hms.harvard.edu/bionumber.aspx?s=y&id=100706&ver=0 
[https://perma.cc/JG5S-2KAZ]. 
 71 See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency 
Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 
Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1549 (2015); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL 
STREET REVOLT (2014) (focusing on an effort to reduce the length of 
underground cables between trading centers in New York and Chicago in order 
to gain microsecond-level trading advantages). 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 129 
general formats to all.72  Taken together, these facts dictate 
that one particular type of information trader will often be the 
one that captures the trading value of newly released data: 
the infamous high-speed trader. 
Given these attributes, it should come as little surprise 
that information trading is generally the realm of institutions.  
But not all information traders operate in the same exact 
way. 
Members of one group—such as the news-based, high-
speed traders—buy and sell stocks solely based on their 
ability to procure, process, and trade on new computer-
readable information.73  From receipt of the information to 
completed trade takes only milliseconds.74  As one might 
imagine, their analysis of new information for the most part 
takes place before they receive it.  They use carefully designed 
algorithms to buy and sell based on one of many expected 
new data points, waiting only for the information to be 
inputted into their algorithms.75  There are rumored to be 
perhaps a dozen or two of these firms that dominate this type 
of high-speed trading. 
Those in another group—thousands of private equity 
funds, activist hedge funds, and actively managed mutual 
funds—rely on the actual human processing of news.76  Their 
trading arises out of their own research or that of any one or 
more of thousands of firms from which they purchase “buy 
side” securities analysis.  Importantly, in contrast to the work 
of news-based, high-speed traders, the scrutiny of firms’ 
stock prices performed by these information traders is likely 
 
 72 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, 
Informed Trading and Its Regulation 32–33 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the authors) (describing these types of traders, and labeling them 
“announcement traders”). 
 74 See supra note 70. 
 75 Somewhat amusingly, these pre-programed algorithms misfire from time 
to time.  See, e.g., Jamila Trindle, Hacked Tweet Prods Revamp, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 30, 2013, 3:27 p.m.), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732448250457845511400211
4382 (noting that markets dropped by considerable amounts in an instant 
when the Associated Press’s hacked Twitter feed reported the words “White 
House,” “President Barack Obama,” and “explosions” in the same sentence—
even though the network news correspondents on the White House lawn had 
nothing unusual to report). 
 76 Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg refer to these information traders as 
“fundamental value traders.”  Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 73, at  31 
n.61. 
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vital to ensuring stock-price accuracy.  While the former 
group’s work merely gets information into stock prices 
milliseconds before it would otherwise find its way into those 
prices, the latter group’s work often does something very 
different: it gets more and better information into stock prices 
after post-information-release analysis that occurs not within 
milliseconds, but instead over the course of minutes, hours, 
days, or even weeks.  Still, it is worth noting that once that 
study is complete, the trading that occurs in light of it 
increasingly happens only through sophisticated algorithmic 
trade-execution programs.77 
The last important point to note is that whatever their 
subtype, information traders move in and out of stock 
positions frequently and quickly.  Some do so more and faster 
than others.  On one end of the spectrum, high-speed traders 
buy and sell out of positions in large volumes based on the 
information in new announcements in well under the time 
needed for the blink of an eye.  On the other end of that 
spectrum, investment funds commonly hold stocks based on 
their fundamental-value analysis for sustained periods more 
easily measureable in years than milliseconds, seconds, 
hours, or even days.  However, even these longer-term 
information traders face pressure from the firm-specific risk 
associated with loading up on a long or short position in one 
or more companies based on information, and therefore 
generally trade in and out of those positions far more 
frequently than the next type of trader in this market model: 
the portfolio trader. 
2. Portfolio Traders 
Portfolio traders transact to accumulate, maintain, and 
liquidate diversified portfolios of stocks.  Some portfolio 
traders are individual, ordinary, long-term investors who put 
together a wide-ranging basket of stocks through retail-level 
online brokerage accounts, such as those offered by the 
Charles Schwabs, Vanguards, Fidelities, and TIAA-CREFs of 
the world.  These investors thus engage in portfolio trading 
 
 77 Information traders and other institutional buyers and sellers routinely 
pay for services to execute their large trading needs in a manner that has the 
least possible impact on market prices.  For example, Goldman Sachs 
Execution Services works with investment funds to achieve that end.  A number 
of businesses that are widely known in industry circles, such as that run by the 
Investment Technology Group, also provide these services. 
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directly.  But most portfolio trading is attributable to 
relatively low-cost intermediaries, such as index-based 
mutual funds78 operated by those same securities businesses, 
or pension funds79 operated by companies, government 
agencies, or, increasingly, labor unions.  The ordinary 
investors who participate in the market through these 
intermediaries thus engage in portfolio trading only in an 
indirect fashion. 
Portfolio traders seek monetary gain over long-run 
periods by using surplus savings to create wealth for their 
future use.  But unlike information trading, portfolio trading 
does not focus on newly released information about firms’ 
prospects.  Information about individual firms has no direct—
or even proximately indirect—relevance to the enterprise.  
Instead, portfolio traders invest as a matter of routine.  For 
instance, individuals contribute to retirement accounts 
through payroll deductions twice a month.  Similarly, 
institutional portfolio traders buy and sell to rebalance their 
portfolios or meet redemption or subscription demands from 
those retirement savers and the like based on their savings 
and consumption patterns.  In the end, portfolio traders 
participate in the market to earn the market-wide risk 
premium that is available to those who provide their capital 
to public companies in return for the expected payouts 
associated with ownership of those equity instruments.80 
 
 78 We used actively managed mutual funds above to illustrate information 
trading.  However, when these funds trade to assemble and maintain diversified 
indexes of stocks rather than to beat the market based on fundamental-value 
analysis, they are engaging in portfolio trading.  There is reason to believe that 
a large portion—if not the majority altogether—of these intermediaries’ trading 
is actually associated with portfolio trading.  See Jonathan Lewellen, 
Institutional Investors and the Limits of Arbitrage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 77 
(2011).  After all, even when they conduct their stock picking, they still hold, on 
average, 85% or so of their portfolio in a simple diversified index. 
 79 Here, we include only the trading that pension funds conduct directly in 
order to assemble and maintain a diversified portfolio of stocks.  We do not 
include the information trading that they conduct in their own accounts based 
on information, or when they allocate funds to private equity funds, hedge 
funds, and actively managed mutual funds to do the same on their behalf. 
 80 As Modern Portfolio Theory teaches, investors can reduce the riskiness 
associated with uncertain future cash flows by holding a diverse portfolio of 
stocks.  Holding such a basket of stocks effectively eliminates firm-specific risk, 
leaving stock owners exposed to only market-wide risk.  All else equal, those 
who face lower levels of risk as a result of holding rights to varying future cash 
flows will place a higher value on any individual stock than those who face 
higher levels of risk associated with those holdings—dictating that investors 
with diversified portfolios will own a large portion of public equity and earn 
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Three final points about portfolio traders bear brief 
mention—all three of which are crucial to our ultimate 
conclusions. 
First, in contrast to information traders, portfolio traders 
place a relatively low value on execution speed and timing.  
By definition, they are not transacting based on quickly 
depreciating information about firms’ prospects relative to 
current market prices.  Rather, they are simply trying to 
assemble and maintain a portfolio that tracks some large part 
of the market.  Or to liquidate it in light of consumption 
needs.  So, before their transactions take place, as far as they 
know, stock prices during that next interval of time have a 
more or less 50-50 chance of increasing or decreasing.81  So, 
ex ante, whether their orders to buy and sell pieces of their 
portfolios are executed in a fraction of a millisecond, a 
second, a minute, an hour, or even perhaps several days is 
largely irrelevant to them. 
Second, the number of portfolio traders is enormous, and 
their trading dominates the stock market during normal 
times.  Approximately 50% of all Americans invest in the 
stock market.82  And countless international investors do the 
same.  And as some of these many individuals—directly or 
indirectly—buy stock to accumulate pieces of their portfolio 
each day, and others sell to liquidate pieces of their portfolios 
in the same period (and still others trade to rebalance their 
diversified portfolios in that period), the ratio of portfolio 
trades to informed trades becomes quite high during normal 
times.  In fact, financial economists have asserted that the 
percentage of informed trading in the market in such times 
falls merely in the range of 5% or so—with portfolio trading 
making up the majority of all other trading.83 
 
whatever premium is available to those who take on market-wide risk. 
 81 The idea is simply that stock prices follow a random walk after all new 
information has been fully incorporated into them.  For one of the seminal 
works on this concept, see generally Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of 
Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965) (offering one of the seminal 
descriptions of this concept). 
 82 Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own 
Stocks, GALLUP (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/little-
change-percentage-americans-invested-market.aspx [https://perma.cc/QT5G-
AUPH]. 
 83 See Hadiye Aslan, David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O’Hara, 
The Characteristics of Informed Trading: Implications for Asset Pricing, 18 J. 
EMPIRICAL FIN. 782 (2011); David Easley, Robert F. Engle, Maureen O’Hara & 
Liuren Wu, Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades, 6 J. 
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Lastly, the story of the average portfolio trader is, far 
more often than not, a happy one.  The average investor who 
held a portfolio of stocks that indexed the American stock 
market over sustained periods throughout the course of the 
twentieth century did quite well.  According to the most 
famous study of long-term investment returns in modern 
markets, these diversified investors earned, on average, a 
6.5% post-inflation return per year.84  And those who invested 
in indexes of the sixteen largest domestic stock markets in 
the world over the same period earned similar market-wide 
risk premiums.85  So, whether or not they have a nuanced 
familiarity with these financial-economic principles and the 
empirical literature in the area, ordinary investors who 
assemble portfolios of stock are no fools—unlike the third 
type of trader in this model. 
3. Noise Traders 
Noise traders are a hybrid of information traders and 
portfolio traders: they look like the latter, but behave like the 
former.  Like information traders, noise traders seek to use 
new information in order to purchase underpriced stocks or 
sell overpriced ones.  However, they trade based on 
information that does not actually indicate such a 
mispricing—usually because the information on which they 
are buying or selling has already been impounded into 
market prices by the time they have finished watching Power 
Lunch on CNBC.  Thus, these market participants operate on 
the false premise that they possess a profitable informational 
advantage. 
An example helps illustrate how these traders operate 
and why they generally lose.  Suppose that Bud starts a 
hedge fund called Fox Investments LP.  Suppose too that he 
watches cable news one Friday morning in his office while 
logged onto his firm’s e*Trade account.  Then he waits for the 
news to announce expected revisions to the University of 
Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment at 9:55 a.m.  The 
broadcast shares the Michigan announcement, and it’s good 
news: the index has gone up.  This upward revision is 
interpreted as an indication that American consumers feel 
 
FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171 (2008). 
 84 See ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE 
OPTIMISTS: 101 YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 42 (2002). 
 85 See id. 
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better about the state of the economy, and that they are 
therefore likely to buy more goods and services from publicly 
traded companies.  Immediately after seeing the good news, 
Bud presses his trigger finger on his keyboard, submitting an 
order to purchase some exchange-traded funds that track the 
entire domestic market.  By the time the order is transacted, 
however, those ETFs are no longer underpriced.  The 
Michigan results would have to travel from Michigan or its 
agents to the news station to be broadcast, and then that 
broadcast would still have to make its way up to a satellite, 
and down to Fox’s office—all before the fund’s buy order 
travels from its computer, along fiber-optic cables to its 
brokerage’s servers, which would then likely route the orders 
to one of many trading centers for execution.  This process 
would take at least several seconds, which is an eternity in 
the contemporary stock market.  Recent research shows that 
in this particular example, after the release of the Michigan 
data, it is likely that market prices incorporate the news in 
just 200 milliseconds86—that is, long before Bud has even 
heard the news.  So, Fox Investments has simply purchased a 
stock index at its new, more accurate price.  It is paying what 
it is worth, but net of trading fees, it isn’t making a profit on 
the stale information it is using to animate the trade. 
Critically, the individuals who engage in portfolio trading 
through retail brokerage accounts and many of the 
ten-thousand-plus investment funds that operate in the 
United States87 sit precariously close to the line that divides 
them from noise traders.  And noise traders do not simply 
buy and sell securities at market prices that reflect the most 
recent information available.  Instead, they act as a mob.  
Until better-informed traders correct it, this mob action 
causes market prices to go up (based on mob buying) or down 
(based on mob selling) beyond what the new information at 
issue called for.  This means that noise traders often buy at 
prices that are actually higher than the price dictated by the 
new information, and sell at prices that are actually lower 
than that price.  It follows that, more often than not, their 
trading earns them losses as traders with better abilities to 
 
 86 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 87 There are estimated to be over 11,000 hedge funds alone.  See Lawrence 
Delevingne, Hedge Fund Industry Snapshot: $2.6 Trillion in 11,000 Funds, CNBC 
(Aug. 31, 2014, 9:00 a.m.), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/industry-
snapshot-26-trillion-in-11000-funds.html [https://perma.cc/JF6M-UGCE]. 
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digest all available information silence the noise.88 
4. Professional-Liquidity-Providing Traders 
The final type of trader in this market model is the 
professional-liquidity-providing one. Professional liquidity 
providers buy and sell not for their own directional 
investment account, but rather as counterparties who stand 
ready, willing, and able to transact with other traders at firm 
bid and ask price quotes.  These professionals allow 
information traders, portfolio traders, and noise traders to 
transact stock immediately with certainty against those 
quotes.  They focus not on understanding the fundamental 
value of the instruments they trade,89 but rather on creating 
a two-sided market that allows them to buy stock from some 
traders at bid prices that are below the ask prices for which 
they sell the stock to other traders.90  When there is lots of 
buying against their ask prices, they move both their bid and 
ask prices up around what the market appears to think the 
new value of the stock is.  When there is a good deal of selling 
against their bid prices, they do the opposite.  Professional 
liquidity providers are thus nothing more than the 
contemporary, broader version of traditional market 
makers—and, like portfolio traders, are market participants 
that buy and sell based on extra-informational reasons. 
In the old days—that is, about a decade and a half ago—
individuals on the floor of stock exchanges, known as 
“specialists,” provided this function for individual stocks.  
There was a specialist for IBM and P&G and every other 
high-volume public stock, and he stood there ready, willing, 
and able to buy from anyone who wanted to sell, and ready, 
 
 88 Some traders might be able to consistently predict this type of noise 
trading and its short-run effects on market prices.  They may therefore, for 
example, buy along with noise traders as the noise traders place upward 
pressure on prices through their mass buying, and then sell before market 
prices are corrected.  To the extent that traders do this, they are information 
traders and not noise traders.  But the information on which they trade is not 
socially valuable fundamental-value information that makes prices better 
predictors of the future cash flows firms will produce.  Rather, it is simply 
order-flow and intra-market price-movement information that might erode 
price-accuracy. 
 89 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 277 (“[Liquidity providers] tend to . . . not 
know much about . . . the fundamental values of the instruments that they 
trade.”). 
 90 See, e.g., id. at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try to discover the 
prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”). 
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willing, and able to sell to anyone who wanted to buy.  And in 
the markets that existed away from the floor of these 
exchanges, securities dealers provided this liquidity.  Today, 
high-frequency traders have replaced these more traditional 
market markers.91 
A further level of detail is important for what follows.  
Professional liquidity providers’ ask prices are, as a general 
matter, above the market’s current assessment of a stock’s 
fundamental value, and their bid prices are below that 
market value—with each spread out equidistantly from it.92  It 
is this spacing out of bid and ask prices around current 
values that allows professional liquidity providers to earn 
their “bid-ask spread.”  And by placing their bid quotes and 
ask quotes equidistantly—yet not too far—away from stocks’ 
current market values, they can better attract the even 
two-sided flow of trader buy and sell orders that they seek. 
Because professional liquidity providers transact at this 
bid-ask spread, there is generally a difference between, on the 
one hand, the prices at which market participants can 
purchase and sell stocks quickly and, on the other, the 
market’s valuation of those stocks.  This delta dictates that a 
trader seeking to buy a stock from a liquidity provider will 
generally pay more than the stock’s market value to procure 
it, and that a trader who wants to sell a stock to a liquidity 
provider will for the most part receive less than that value in 
return for it. 
Critically, the size of this delta between the market’s 
assessment of a stock’s fundamental value and liquidity 
providers’ ask and bid prices determines the quality of the 
price received by investors who want to trade on demand.  
Bid and ask prices that are closer to that market assessment 
result in better-quality prices for those who seek to transact 
on demand.  And conversely, bid and ask prices that are 
farther away from that market valuation lead to worse-quality 
 
 91 See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Tradings and Its Impact on 
Market Quality 2 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://secure.fia.org/ptg-
downloads/hft_trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/BPY4-W97Q] (using a NASDAQ 
data set to show that high-frequency traders supply liquidity for over half of all 
trades); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New 
Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712, 714 (2013) (describing the rise of the high-
frequency trader). 
 92 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 287–88 (“[Liquidity providers] . . . set their 
bid prices just below fundamental values and their ask prices just above . . . .”). 
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ones for those investors.93 
An example helps make these important mechanical 
points easier to internalize.  Assume the market current 
values a stock at $10.50 per share.  If liquidity providers were 
transacting traders’ sell orders for the stock at bid prices of 
$10.48 per share, then those traders could sell the stock to 
the liquidity providers by accepting the $10.48 price.  If the 
liquidity providers were also executing other traders’ buy 
orders for the stock at ask prices of $10.52 per share, then 
those traders could procure it by paying the $10.52 price.  As 
such, when a liquidity provider buys the stock at its best 
(highest) bid price of $10.48 per share from a trader’s sell 
order, and then turns around and sells those shares to 
another trader at its best (lowest) ask price of $10.52 per 
share, it would earn $0.04 per each share bought and then 
sold.  And from the perspective of other traders, there would 
thus be a $0.02 spread cost associated with either buying 
from, or selling to, these liquidity providers—as buyers must 
pay $10.52 for a stock worth $10.50, and sellers only receive 
$10.48 for the same.  If the liquidity providers were instead 
posting best (highest) bid prices of $10.00 and best (lowest) 
ask prices of $11.00 around that same $10.50 market value, 
traders seeking to transact on demand against them would be 
receiving markedly inferior prices. 
What determines the quality of these liquidity-provider 
prices?  As we discuss in the next section, the most 
important determinant of the quality of liquidity-provider 
prices in the market is generally information asymmetry.94 
 
 93 The quality of these prices is determined by much more than simply the 
spread between the best (highest) bid prices and the best (lowest) ask prices in 
the market.  Liquidity providers post only a limited number of shares at those 
prices.  They then post limited numbers of shares at a series of successively 
inferior bid prices and ask prices.  So, the quality of the prices received by 
traders who transact on demand in this fashion generally depends on the 
quality of a mix of quoted prices and the number of shares available at them—
and not simply on the prices associated with the best bids and asks. 
 94 Although professional liquidity providers make a business out of posting 
bid and ask quotes and earning their spreads, all other traders also can attempt 
to complete some of their trading by posting quotes against which other market 
participants can transact.  That is, information, portfolio, and noise traders 
may try to achieve their buying needs not by transacting against liquidity 
providers’ ask prices on demand, but instead by posting bids of their own—or 
complete their selling not by executing against liquidity providers’ bid prices 
right away, but instead by quoting asks of their own.  Today, at least on the 
registered exchanges where most trading takes place, any market participant 
can freely attempt to accomplish its trading needs via providing liquidity to 
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B. Information Asymmetries and the Main Costs It 
Imposes 
Talk of the concern for the harm that the ordinary, 
long-term investors incur at the hands of sophisticated pros 
who have better information is common.95  It would be unfair 
in many circumstances, the thinking goes, if these 
individuals who invest directly through retail-level brokerage 
accounts or indirectly through portfolio-trading investment 
funds suffered losses as a result of investing in a market in 
which better-informed traders lurk.  These information 
asymmetries and the “information-asymmetry costs” (IA 
costs) to which they give rise are the main costs about which 
regulators are concerned when they attempt to improve 
ordinary-investor fairness.96  Given the centrality of the 
concern for these asymmetries and related costs to IDL today 
and the nature of our critique of its present form in Parts III 
and IV below, this section transitions to that original analysis 
by describing the most apparent way in which IA costs are 
observed in the market. 
The clearest indication of the IA costs that portfolio 
traders incur is found in the quality of liquidity-provider 
pricing in the market.  When professional liquidity providers 
hold out their firm quotes to the market, they make 
themselves vulnerable to traders who have better information 
on the true value of stocks.  Professional liquidity providers 
thus often find themselves on the other side of trades with 
better-informed traders.  This vulnerability makes sense.  
Professional liquidity providers are specialized market 
participants that learn the news through the flow of orders 
sent their way rather than based on their own analysis of new 
fundamental-value information before it becomes reflected in 
market prices.97  Once again, their focus is instead on setting 
 
other traders in this manner.  Each registered exchange must allow brokers or 
dealers to become members of its exchange.  See Securities and Exchange Act 
§ 6(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2) (2012).  And all exchanges must post bid and ask 
quotes submitted by their members.  See Regulation National Market System 
Rule 604, 17 C.F.R. § 242.604 (2016).  When traders sit back and patiently buy 
and sell by waiting for other market participants to transact against their bid 
and ask quotes, respectively, in this way, they are said to “make” liquidity for 
the market.  (In contrast, when they transact against other liquidity providers’ 
quotes, they are said to “take” liquidity.). 
 95 See supra section I.A.2.a. 
 96 See supra Introduction. 
 97 See supra section II.A.4. 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 139 
bid and ask prices that will produce an even two-sided flow of 
incoming buy and sell orders, thereby allowing them to earn a 
bid-ask spread from a long line of liquidity-demanding 
portfolio traders.98  Focusing on things like the ratio of buy 
and sell orders that come their way rather than on things like 
the import of new corporate earnings’ announcements, 
professional liquidity providers frequently find themselves at 
an informational disadvantage when they supply their 
services to information traders—and therefore sustain trading 
losses to them.99 
All else being equal, when professional liquidity providers 
expect to incur larger losses at the hands of better-informed 
traders in any given time period, they quote inferior prices to 
the market.100  By quoting bid prices that are further south 
from a stock’s current value, and ask prices further north 
from that same value, they better deter information traders 
from trading opposite them by reducing their trading 
profits.101  Thus, professional liquidity providers will quote 
worse prices (i.e.., prices further away from current market 
values) when they expect a higher chance of transacting 
opposite better-informed traders.102 
 
 98 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 99 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the side of 
the market on which they trade, and the . . . [professional liquidity providers] 
end up losing money to them.”).  For a more detailed explanation in the legal 
literature of exactly how information traders impose losses on professional 
liquidity providers, see Haeberle, supra note 67. 
 100 For the seminal work modeling this information asymmetry and the 
adverse-selection issues associated with it, see HARRIS, supra note 5, at 6, 298; 
Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a 
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 
75 (1985);. 
 101 Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 100.  Quoting inferior prices also helps 
liquidity providers in a second way: by increasing the amount of their take from 
each “roundtrip transaction,” in industry parlance, in which they are able to 
buy at their bid and turn around and sell at their ask opposite portfolio traders 
whose trading—unlike that of information traders—generally does not move 
prices.  This helps them make up their losses through a steady spread with bid 
(buy) transactions at prices that are in fact lower than ask (sell) transactions.  
For the original work modeling the main way in which these liquidity providers 
offset their losses to information traders by transacting with “uninformed” 
investors, see Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 
ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985).  See also HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299. 
 102 In today’s market, the average spread between the best (highest) bid 
price for a stock and the best (lowest) ask price is quite small.  For thickly 
traded large-capitalization stocks, the size of this spread is usually in the 
one-cent range and for thinly traded small-capitalization stock, that spread is 
typically in the nine-cent range.  See, e.g., CFA INSTITUTE, DARK POOLS, 
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This conclusion has special import for more than just 
professional liquidity providers.  Of significance here, it 
means that portfolio traders—and therefore ordinary 
investors—will face inferior prices when transacting against 
liquidity-provider quotes during periods of high information 
asymmetry in the market.  Simply put, when information 
traders have knowledge of information that is not yet 
incorporated into market prices, liquidity providers—
perceiving an asymmetry in information know by them versus 
that known by information traders based on the one-side buy 
(or sell) orders they are receiving—will protect themselves by 
quoting inferior prices until the information asymmetry is 
resolved.103  And during those periods, portfolio traders—and 
consequently ordinary investors—will face inferior prices.  
Whether or not articulated in this fine-tuned way, it is mainly 
these IA costs that drive the concern for the harm that 
ordinary, long-term investors incur as a result of 
participating in a market in which better-informed traders 
lurk.  And it is these IA costs embodied in price quotes of 
inferior quality that we use next to show previously 
unidentified effects of IDL on ordinary-investor wellbeing.104 
* * * 
As this basic model of key aspects of the American stock 
market illustrates, four entirely different types of traders 
inhabit the market.  While each of them is after financial 
 
INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MARKET QUALITY 5 (2012), 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2012.n5.1.  However, even 
stocks with average spreads of a mere penny will have periods in which their 
spreads are far larger.  And liquidity providers only quote limited quantities at 
their best prices, and then post limited quantities at a series of successively 
inferior ones.  See supra note 93.  Thus, a liquidity provider may protect itself in 
the way mentioned in the text by quoting inferior prices in two ways: by 
increasing the size of the spread between its best bid and ask prices for a period 
of time or by thinning out its offerings both its best bids and asks as well as all 
successively inferior bids and asks, or both. 
 103 See supra section II.A.4.  Notably, these inferior prices are often material 
even when traders are buying and selling large-capitalization stocks that on 
average have a $0.01 spread between the best bid and ask prices available in 
the market.  Once again, the size of those average spreads fluctuates 
throughout the trading day, and at least large traders are concerned with both 
that size and the fact that they will often have to transact against limited 
numbers of shares at both those best prices as well as at a series of 
successively inferior bid and ask prices.  See supra note 100. 
 104    For a deeper look at the way in which portfolio traders incur IA costs, 
see Kevin S. Haeberle, Welcoming Information Asymmetry: The Case for 
Reversing the Investor-Protection Presumption (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the authors). 
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gain, their very different motivations and strategies lead to 
them interacting in complex ways.  Of paramount 
significance, information traders profit by discovering and 
bringing new information to the market.  But to gain from 
speculating on this information, these traders must 
necessarily impose losses on some other traders.  In this Part, 
we have shown how they do so—focusing on the direct losses 
they impose on professional market makers, the 
inferior-quote response by those professionals, and the 
resulting higher IA costs incurred by ordinary investors. 
In the next Part, we build on this model to do what the 
securities regulators have apparently failed to do: attempt to 
see the true effects of the equal-timing requirements at the 
heart of IDL today on these IA costs.  We thus explain how 
this growing and under-theorized area of the law actually 
affects the wellbeing of not only an important group of market 
participants who policymakers have long sought to protect as 
a general matter, but also the very group of investors who are 
alleged to be the principal beneficiaries of that area of law. 
III 
THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF IDL ON ORDINARY INVESTORS’ 
WELLBEING 
In this Part we show how the 
simultaneous-dissemination requirements that define IDL 
today actually affect ordinary investors.  We do so by first 
looking at how they affect information asymmetries in the 
market generally, and then by examining the impact of those 
effects on specific groups of everyday investors.  In the end, 
we conclude that Reg FD has an ambiguous impact on the 
welfare of ordinary investors on the whole.  We also explain 
some promise onto which it appears to have stumbled.  But 
at the same time, we discuss why there is strong reason to 
believe that the regulation is perversely making things worse 
for the ordinary investors who stand in the most precarious 
position in the market (those who trade directly through 
brokerage accounts rather than indirectly through funds).  
We also theorize that the NYAG initiative from the past few 
years that has stopped seconds-early access to 
market-moving information leaves ordinary investors worse 
off than they would be without it.  And we briefly touch on 
why the SEC’s 2014–2015 EDGAR initiative has an impact 
that falls somewhere between that of Reg FD and the NYAG’s 
action—although closer to the latter.  Thus, in this Part, we 
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analyze the extent to which the current form of each of these 
examples of IDL furthers its primary stated ends. 
A. Effects on Information Asymmetries in the Market 
Generally 
To see how Reg FD and the related recent efforts affect 
the wellbeing of ordinary investors in general, one must think 
about the nature of information asymmetries in the market 
after new information is released in two worlds.  The first 
world is the one in which we live today.  The second is a 
hypothetical parallel one in which information producers are 
freely permitted to reveal their information in a tiered manner 
before sharing it more widely. 
1. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods 
When Simultaneity is Required 
Simultaneous-dissemination requirements have 
important effects on the trading environment in the tens of 
thousands of periods105 throughout the year that occur after 
market-moving information is first released beyond those who 
are barred from trading on it. 
When new information is first released to all potential 
investors at the same exact time in compliance with the law 
today, information traders immediately procure, process, and 
trade on it.  All the while, at least those who specialize in 
something other than such speculative trading remain in the 
dark on at least the import of the new information for some 
period—even if they have the right to access it equally.  In 
many cases, the informational disadvantage will be 
attributable to a lack of access to hyper-fast 
information-dissemination and trade-execution systems.  In 
others, the issue will generally boil down to a lack of interest 
in the new information.106  Thus, when public companies and 
 
 105 See, e.g., Jackson, Jiang & Mitts, supra note 19, at 9 (showing that over 
40,000 filings by public companies were made during one 16-week period in 
2014).  Although so many public-firm disclosure filings are made each year, 
only some subset of them contains market-moving information.  And, only a 
subset of those disclosures is released during the trading day.  Whatever the 
exact number of important disclosures released during normal trading hours, 
two things are clear: the 5,000 or so United States public firms combine to 
make a very large number of disclosures that move market prices, and other 
entities that sit far outside the scope of mandatory-disclosure law also release a 
large number of similar informational products. 
 106 See supra section II.A (comparing information traders’ focus on new 
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other important information producers initially release 
information today, there is a period characterized by an 
asymmetry in information known by sophisticated 
information-trading pros and that known by almost all other 
market participants. 
Crucially, though, this post-release period of heightened 
information asymmetry before business as usual picks up 
again must be both acute and short-lived.  Thanks to 
equal-timing requirements, any trader can access corporate 
disclosures and the like as soon as they are released.  It 
follows that those who aim to profit by trading based on at 
least relatively clear inferences from the released information 
must procure it, analyze it, and execute on it immediately—
lest the competition beats them to the punch.  In fact, in 
today’s high-speed, electronic stock market, the value of at 
least computer-readable information with import for market 
prices that can be evaluated with consensus valuation 
models is thought to disappear altogether within well under a 
second of its public release. 
Both recent empirical study and industry practice 
evidence this conclusion.  With regard to the former, financial 
economists studied the trading environment associated with 
the release of the data found in the University of Michigan 
Index of Consumer Sentiment.  They found that, when it was 
known that this relatively easy-to-interpret information would 
be made available to the entire public shortly, the information 
routinely became incorporated into market prices with a 
flurry of trading activity within just 200 milliseconds of its 
release to a dozen or so information traders.107  With regard to 
the latter, the information asymmetries are so powerful 
during post-release periods today that professional liquidity 
providers are known to cease to supply their services 
altogether when they expect or begin to detect the trading 
associated with the release of new information.108  By taking 
 
market-moving information to the extra-informational bases on which portfolio 
traders and professional liquidity providers trade). 
 107 Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; see supra notes 32–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 108 On a panel at a securities-law conference at Columbia Law School with 
one of us in November of 2014, the CEO of one of the largest liquidity providers 
in the market today acknowledged this common response to the public release 
of new information.  Douglas Cifu, CEO, Virtu Financial LLC, Remarks at 
Columbia Law School conference on “Current Issues in Securities Regulation: 
The Hot Topics” (Nov. 21, 2014). 
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the exceptional step of removing themselves altogether from 
the market during these brief bursts of information 
asymmetry, they broadly protect themselves from incurring 
losses to better-informed traders around the time at which 
they occur.109 
Of course, evaluating the true import of other 
harder-to-digest information may instead take much longer.  
But in a world with the current equal-timing mandates, 
information traders have little time to waste when it comes to 
the fast and furious race to profit based on even that type of 
newly shared information.  They can either analyze the new 
information and trade on it as quickly as the competition, or 
sit this particular game out altogether. 
Ultimately, then, under current IDL, a large amount of 
information asymmetry is often condensed into a small period 
of time lasting as little as well under a second that ensues 
after new information is made available to all investors. 
2. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods that 
Would Exist if Tiered Dissemination Were Allowed 
To be sure, even in a world without the current 
simultaneous-dissemination requirements, there would still 
be heightened information asymmetries in the market 
following the release of new information.  But those 
asymmetries after the time at which that information would 
first begin to be exposed to the market would generally look 
very different. 
Without Reg FD, public companies could reveal their 
material information piecemeal to select traders before 
sharing it with the public.  In a hypothetical world in which 
the regulation did not exist, then, some information traders 
would at times be able to access, analyze, and trade on 
information before the market more generally was even aware 
that it had been released.  These fortunate traders would no 
doubt use the information to trade profitably as soon as they 
got their hands on it, aiming to buy underpriced stocks and 
sell overpriced ones opposite unknowing counterparties—just 
like in the current world where simultaneity is required.  
Critically, however, while the select traders with this type of 
 
 109 See supra section II.A.4 (explaining how professional liquidity providers 
protect themselves from better-informed traders in the market by quoting 
inferior prices). 
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informational advantage would want to act on the advantage 
before it dissipates, they would also have an incentive to 
attempt to trade under the radar in smaller increments over 
time.  This type of trading approach would allow them to 
accumulate larger positions before their trading moves prices.  
This makes sense.  If they instead pursued a fast-and-furious 
approach to trading like the one that must occur in 
post-(simultaneous) release periods today, then their own 
market activity would tip their hands to the market—thereby 
eliminating their informational advantage.  Thus, they would 
try to build up their trading position over time with quiet, yet 
sustained, trading.110 
Recent empirical study supports the notion that trading 
takes place in this manner when traders know that they have 
access to information significantly ahead of the time at which 
it will become more widely available.  In fact, “significantly 
ahead of time” may include time-based advantages limited to 
a few minutes.111 
These observations give rise to the inference that 
information asymmetries in the stock market would be higher 
than normal after the first stages of (tiered) information 
release in this hypothetical world in which tiered information 
revelation were allowed.  However, because the concern for 
the dissipation of the informational advantage does not 
dominate as it does when information must be disseminated 
to all at once, we should expect only slightly heightened 
asymmetry over the weeks, days, hours, and even minutes 
leading up to the time at which the information is expected to 
be announced to the public.  The exact length of the period of 
heightened information asymmetry would depend on just how 
far ahead the initial tiered releases of the information began 
before the full public release of the information. 
Of paramount importance, though, so long as the earlier 
releases occurred more than a handful of seconds or even 
minutes before the full public release, the information 
asymmetry would be of low-grade variety throughout a 
 
 110 Recent empirical work evidences this phenomenon.  See René Caldentey 
& Ennio Stacchetti, Insider Trading with a Random Deadline, 78 ECONOMETRICA 
245, 245–48 (2010). 
 111 See Jackson, Jiang & Mitts, supra note 19, at 4, 25–26 (showing that 
when traders had an informational advantage based on early access to EDGAR 
filings in 2014–2015 that was expected to last a few minutes, as opposed to 
seconds, they spread out their trading throughout those minutes to avoid 
signaling their information to the market). 
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sustained period.  After all, the portfolio trading that 
dominates normal times112 would generally continue on 
throughout these periods.  Indeed, if the post-(tiered) release 
trading by information traders is spread out over enough 
time, an enormous number of portfolio traders would come 
and go in and out of the market throughout that time.113  
Thus, with the overwhelming majority of all activity in the 
market still attributable to non-information-based trading 
during these periods, there would only be a slightly higher 
chance than normal for any given trader to find himself at an 
informational disadvantage in the market. 
Accordingly, in a world in which corporate information 
may be revealed piecemeal without restraint, market-moving 
information would often leak out over time—and, in contrast 
to today’s post-release bursts, would then involve only 
slightly heightened information asymmetries distributed in a 
relatively smooth manner over a relatively large period of time 
leading up to the one at which the underlying information 
became more broadly available. 
Of course, post-(tiered) release trading in a world without 
the NYAG’s equal-timing effort would look different.  In that 
world, some information would merely be released to some 
traders seconds before being disseminated to the entire 
marketplace.  So, information asymmetries during those 
seconds would be hefty.  And because so much of the import 
of the information would likely be incorporated into prices 
within those seconds-early periods alone,114 the information 
asymmetries associated with more normal times would return 
soon enough.  In fact, this is just what happened when the 
University of Michigan released its market-moving index early 
to high-speed traders in 2013 and 2014 before the NYAG put 
an end to that practice: the new information in the index was 
routinely incorporated into prices in just the first 200 
milliseconds of the two-second-early release, with trading 
then quickly returning to normal.115 
Lastly, the information asymmetries in a post-(tiered) 
release market when trading based on seconds- or 
 
 112 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 113 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and 
accompanying text. 
 115 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and 
accompanying text. 
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minutes-early access to EDGAR filings or the like is permitted 
looks similar—albeit with the acute asymmetries spread out 
over more than merely two seconds or so.  This conclusion 
flows from the fact that EDGAR filings were often released by 
far more than merely two seconds in advance (with many 
coming in at more like three-to-five minutes), and that 
knowledge of the early-release did not seem to be widely 
known.  So, information traders with somewhat secretive 
access to these types of “public” filings before the public 
gained access to them would likely be able to complete their 
trading slowly throughout, for example, an early-advantage 
minute or two.  In fact, recent empirical study evidences just 
this type of trading by information traders when those traders 
had several minutes to complete their early-peak trading 
based on these filings as opposed to some far smaller amount 
of time.116 
3. Conclusion as to the Overall Effects of Simultaneity on 
Information Asymmetries Today 
The above comparisons of the behavior of information 
traders in a world with and without the types of existing 
equal-timing requirements examined here makes clear that 
those requirements have considerable effects on the 
asymmetry in information known by information traders and 
all other participants in the market after information is 
released.  But with this background on those asymmetries in 
both a world with and without these requirements, the overall 
general impact of those efforts on information asymmetries 
both before and after new information is released becomes 
clear. 
At the outset, Reg FD has eliminated much trading based 
on material, non-public corporate information that was 
previously taking place in the hours, days, and weeks leading 
up to the time at which the information was being released to 
the public.117  Consequently, if tiered dissemination were 
instead allowed over this sustained period today, information 
producers would begin to selectively release their information 
well before its public announcement.  Asymmetries between 
 
 116 Jackson, Mitts & Jiang, supra note 19, evidence this drawn-out-trading 
result for such longer early releases when studying these very SEC releases; see 
supra section I.A.2 (discussing this trading dynamic more generally). 
 117 See supra section III.A.1 (describing the type of selective-release trading 
that Reg FD eliminated). 
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information traders and all other market participants would 
therefore be higher than normal during those post-(tiered) 
release periods.  That is simply our hypothetical world in 
which tiered dissemination is allowed.118  What this means is 
that by banning the once-common practice of tiered 
dissemination of corporate disclosures, Reg FD slightly 
reduces information asymmetries throughout prolonged 
periods that take place before information is first released (to 
all at once) today. 
But these improvements in information asymmetry are 
not free.  Rather, there is a trade-off.  In suppressing 
information trading in the period leading up to the mandatory 
widespread release of corporate disclosures, Reg FD causes 
there to be markedly higher asymmetries during brief 
post-release periods.  This conclusion is simply the one 
presented earlier: that the regulation creates these bursts of 
information asymmetry by preventing new information and 
much (or even any) of its import from seeping out through 
earlier tiered dissemination, and then leaves information 
traders without the luxury of time to complete their trading in 
an under-the-radar fashion.119 
Combining these two insights allows us to offer the 
following theoretical conclusion about Reg FD’s general effect 
on information asymmetries in the market around the times 
at which new information is released today: the law results in 
asymmetries throughout prolonged periods that are slightly 
lower than they otherwise would be in the period leading up 
to full releases of new information (because much information 
trading is suppressed during that period), yet markedly 
higher ones in the period that takes place just after those full 
releases (because the information comes out with a burst of 
trading when it must be made available to all at once when 
first released). 
The related simultaneity initiative by the NYAG has a 
distinct effect on information asymmetries in the market.  
When some select group of information traders receives 
market-moving information two seconds before it is revealed 
to the market as a whole, its members know that they have 
only two seconds to capture their informational advantage.120  
 
 118 See supra section III.A.2. 
 119 See supra section III.A.1. 
 120 See supra section I.A.2. 
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Those privileged traders therefore transact ferociously during 
their early-peek window—meaning that there will be 
markedly higher information asymmetries during those tiny 
periods that occur just prior to the full public release of the 
information at issue.  When the information is then more 
broadly released two seconds later, it has already begun to be 
incorporated into market prices.  In fact, if material aspects of 
the new information are computer readable and their import 
is clear enough, the information will be incorporated into 
market prices in just a small fraction of that two-second 
window.121  So, the Attorney General’s effort does little more 
than move the point at which brief periods of acute 
information asymmetries start forward in time from one 
moment (e.g., the two-second period just prior to 10:00 a.m.) 
to another that occurs just seconds later (e.g., the two-second 
period that begins with the one and only public release at 
10:00 a.m. sharp). 
The SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative to clean up EDGAR 
filings has effects that fall somewhere between those of Reg 
FD and the NYAG action.  However close it falls to either 
depends on the length of the early release that is being 
eliminated as well as the market’s awareness of the early 
release itself.  The effects of its elimination of minutes-early 
releases of important information might loosely mirror those 
of Reg FD.  But it is clear that at least the end of early 
releases that lasted mere seconds did little more than move 
information asymmetries by that very small amount of time, 
just as with the NYAG action. 
Thus, the likely general overall effects of Reg FD and 
recent related legal initiatives on information asymmetries in 
the market around the time at which new information is 
released are clear.  Reg FD leads to slightly smaller 
asymmetries during prolonged Reg FD pre-release periods, 
yet markedly higher ones during brief Reg FD post-release 
ones.  The NYAG’s initiative from the past few years simply 
moves a period of acute information asymmetry from, for 
example, the two seconds just prior to the public revelation of 
information to the two seconds just after it.  Finally, to the 
extent that it stops tiered disseminations in the seconds-long 
range, the SEC’s recent initiative to clean up its release of 
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accompanying text. 
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public-company filings likely affects these asymmetries in a 
similar way to the way in which the NYAG’s action affects 
them.  But to the extent that the effort stops opaque early 
releases better measured in minutes, its effects begin to look 
more like that of Reg FD. 
B. Effects on the Wellbeing of Specific Groups of Ordinary 
Investors 
In this section, we build on our general model of 
IDL-related information asymmetries by examining how the 
effects of Reg FD, the NYAG action, and the 2014–2015 SEC 
EDGAR initiative affect the wellbeing of ordinary investors.  
Specifically, we split the universe of ordinary investors into 
three groups based on how they trade, and use our 
conclusions from above to see how the law affects each.  By 
undertaking this analysis, we do something that the 
proponents of these aspects of IDL apparently have failed to 
do: understand the extent to which they are theoretically 
sound given their principal aim.  In the end, we conclude that 
despite regulators’ apparent failure to think about the actual 
effects of their efforts on ordinary investors, there is reason to 
believe that at least Reg FD nevertheless holds some promise 
for many ordinary investors.  But at the same time, it also 
becomes evident that both it and the other two main efforts in 
the area likely harm the most vulnerable ordinary investors.  
These understandings—as well as the more general ones laid 
out just above—provide valuable insights for anyone 
interested in crafting IDL that better achieves its principal 
stated ends.  They also pave the way for us to offer reforms to 
IDL that would unequivocally better achieve those ends in the 
next, final Part of this Article. 
1. Group #1: Ordinary Investors Who Engage in Portfolio 
Trading at Random Times 
Portfolio traders do not trade based on information.122  So 
whether, for example, the individuals who engage in portfolio 
trading directly do so before or after news comes out and 
results in changes to market prices is about as relevant to 
them, ex ante, as whether they trade before or after they 
break for lunch.  Before they trade, that sandwich-and-soda 
delay may cost them thousands, or may save them 
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thousands—but each outcome has an equal chance of 
occurring.  So, they can accomplish their rebalancing and 
similar trading by purchasing and selling when they please, 
without any rush dictated by the availability of new 
information.  (They still may want to trade sooner rather than 
later for a number of reasons—including to avoid being in an 
unbalanced investment position for, for example, days 
beyond the time at which they realize they are in one.)  
Ultimately, then, the great majority of these traders will not 
time their submission of buy-and-sell orders based on when 
they expect new information to be released.  Indeed, it would 
be tough for them to do so given the sheer number of 
potentially important information releases.  Instead, they will 
trade independently of the time at which information is 
expected to be released. 
Reg FD, once again, likely results in the market being 
characterized by slightly lower information asymmetries 
throughout prolonged periods before new information is 
broadly disseminated, yet markedly higher ones during brief 
periods just after that public (simultaneous) dissemination.123  
Consequently, those Group #1 investors whose portfolio 
trading happens to involve buying and selling in the long Reg 
FD pre-release periods today will incur IA costs that are 
slightly lower than the ones they would in the same 
(pre-public-release) time periods in a world without the 
regulation.  But, that enhancement to ordinary-investor 
wellbeing comes at a cost: Many unfortunate Group #1 
investors who engage in portfolio trading in a Reg FD brief 
post-release window will suffer the markedly higher costs 
associated with those dangerous periods. 
For any of this first group of ordinary investors, the 
chances of being left better off as a result of a trade being 
executed during a long pre-release period in which 
information asymmetries are lower than they otherwise would 
be because of Reg FD are undoubtedly higher than that of 
transacting in a brief Reg FD post-release danger zone.  The 
SEC regulation therefore likely leaves these investors better 
off in most of their transactions—but only slightly so.  In 
contrast, many of the unlucky investors in this group whose 
trading stumbles into the moments just after information is 
released today are left significantly worse off due to the 
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intensity of the information asymmetry that is compacted into 
them.  They incur critically higher IA costs. 
Ultimately, Reg FD’s implications for these Group #1 
investors’ wellbeing are ambiguous, as the relative 
magnitudes and probabilities of the pre-release boon to their 
welfare and the brief post-release harm to the same are 
unknown.  Specifically, the implications turn on the size of 
the aggregate pre-release help to ordinary investors relative to 
that of the aggregate post-release harm.  The relative size of 
each is an empirical question.  But at present, it is safe to say 
that the SEC—which apparently failed to spot these issues—
appears to have no basis to claim that Reg FD leaves ordinary 
investors better off. 
Interestingly, though, the SEC may have nevertheless 
stumbled upon regulation that can actually help these 
ordinary investors in a meaningful way.  Savvy portfolio 
trading can shield ordinary investors from circumscribed 
periods of heightened information asymmetry—even when 
their trading takes place at random times and without any 
effort to detect post-release windows.  Those savvy traders 
who seek to avoid completing their non-time-sensitive trading 
during periods where information asymmetries are high—all 
the while without engaging in any market intelligence work 
whatsoever—can deploy a relatively simple trading technique 
in order to protect themselves from the markedly inferior 
liquidity-provider prices associated with relatively brief 
periods of acute information asymmetry: they can seek to 
accomplish their trading via immediate-or-cancel limit orders 
with a limit price that reflects the liquidity-provider pricing 
associated with normal times.  By doing so, they ensure that 
their order to buy or sell either transacts at a price that 
reflects only lower-grade information asymmetries, or gets 
cancelled immediately. 
To explain, imagine that a stock is trading at a $10.48 
best (highest) bid price and $10.52 best (lowest) ask price 
around a then-current market value of $10.50 per share.  
And imagine that this liquidity-provider pricing with a 
four-cent bid-ask spread is a typical one for this stock—that 
is, it reflects the normal asymmetries in information about 
the stock’s value known by information traders versus that 
known by all other traders.124  The savvy portfolio trader can 
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submit an order to buy the stock at $10.52, but place a limit 
price of $10.52 on that order to make sure that it transacts at 
a price no higher than that limit price.  If new information 
hits the market in between the time at which the savvy trader 
looked at market quotes and that at which her order reaches 
a trading platform, liquidity providers might adjust the 
quality of their price quotes downward: to, say, $10.00 best 
(highest) bid prices and $11.00 best (lowest) ask prices 
around that same $10.50 market value.  Such a large 
downward adjustment in the quality of their price quotes 
would help protect them from being adversely selected by 
better-informed traders.125  But thanks to the limit price of 
$10.52, the trader’s order to buy will be cancelled rather than 
transacting at an inferior $11.00 best (lowest) ask price.  (As 
its name suggests, an “immediate or cancel” order either 
executes immediately against a quote, or gets cancelled.)  
Within a short period of time measured by as little as a few 
seconds,126 the new information is likely to be incorporated 
into market prices.  With the information asymmetry ironed 
out, the trader can then return to the market to complete her 
trading at the more typical liquidity-provider prices, just a 
couple of pennies off from the stock’s $10.50 current market 
value—thereby largely eliminating the cost associated with 
the acute post-release information asymmetry. 
Reg FD holds promise to help these ordinary investors 
because it makes it more likely that they will be able to use 
this trading technique to avoid the costs of post-release 
information asymmetry.  This trading tool can be deployed to 
avoid transacting at markedly inferior prices caused by 
considerable information asymmetry that is condensed into 
milliseconds, seconds, and perhaps even minutes or more.  
But it is much less effective—if effective at all—when deployed 
to avoid the IA costs associated with sustained periods of 
low-grade information asymmetry that results from 
information seeping out to the market slowly.  This is 
because the liquidity-provider prices in the market will be 
only slightly inferior to normal during those periods, and 
 
the setting of these market prices). 
 125 See supra section II.A.4 (describing this common liquidity-provider 
response to bursts of information asymmetry today). 
 126 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and 
accompanying text. 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
154 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.101:PPP 
because those periods are prolonged.127  The submission of 
an immediate-or-cancel limit order with a conservative 
enough limit price may avoid transacting against a slightly 
inferior quote, but the trader seeking to avoid that low-grade 
information asymmetry would have to do so over a large 
enough time period to incur other costs that perhaps make it 
not even worthwhile.  With prices inferior by only small 
amounts over such a long period, even the non-time-sensitive 
trading of a portfolio trader would likely prefer to simply pay 
the extra, for example, penny per share associated with the 
heightened information asymmetry rather than incur the 
various costs associated with holding a sub-optimal portfolio 
over days or even weeks. 
Thus, Reg FD compacts information asymmetries into a 
smaller, acute period—thereby allowing portfolio traders to 
protect themselves from much of the bite associated with the 
release of new information.  And although we have no reason 
to believe that regulators had this in mind when 
promulgating Reg FD, this apparent accidental genius of the 
regulation may provide a considerable benefit to many Group 
#1 investors. 
We can, however, say that efforts like the one pursued by 
the NYAG to stop seconds-early releases will have no net 
positive or negative impact on these Group #1 ordinary 
investors.  To the extent that their portfolio trades are 
submitted to the market during, for example, the two seconds 
before 10:00 a.m. on a day when market-moving information 
is being revealed to the public at that time, ordinary investors 
are now markedly better off thanks to the state-level effort.  
To the extent those trades take place in the two seconds just 
after that release, they are equally worse off because of the 
effort.  Those two effects likely more or less cancel each other 
out.  All that the ban does is move the two-second period of 
intense information asymmetry—and therefore heightened 
ordinary-investor IA cost—from one period to another. 
How does the 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR initiative affect 
these ordinary investors whose non-time-sensitive trading is 
accomplished at random times?  To the extent the effort put 
an end to early releases on the order of a mere handful of 
seconds, the effect on Group #1 investors mirrors that of the 
NYAG action.  The general result, without considering more, 
 
 127 See supra section III.A.2. 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 155 
is thus a wash.  To the extent that it stopped tiered 
dissemination on the order of minutes, the effect begins to 
look closer to that of Reg FD. 
But not all portfolio trading is, like that of Group #1 
investors, randomly timed—including that of our second and 
third groups of ordinary investors. 
2. Group #2: Ordinary Investors Who Benefit from 
Portfolio Trading that Seeks to Detect and Avoid the 
Moments After Information Releases 
Despite the steady stream of material disclosures 
provided by 5,000 or so public companies in America and the 
similar flow of other products with market-moving 
information, it is likely that savvy portfolio traders are able to 
identify when much new information will come out.  It is also 
likely that they became aware of the financial danger 
presented by the simultaneous release of information long 
before law professors figured it out.  Although also apparently 
not by design, Reg FD likely leaves these ordinary investors 
facing lower overall IA costs—thereby providing additional 
promise for ordinary investors on the whole.  However, the 
regulatory action to stop early releases of a mere handful of 
minutes or less likely makes no difference to the IA costs they 
incur at all. 
Reg FD makes it easier for those who seek to detect the 
heightened information asymmetries associated with the 
release of information to in fact detect them, and therefore 
makes it easier to avoid IA costs associated with the same.  
This assertion becomes clear by quickly thinking once again 
about the information asymmetries in post-release periods in 
a world with Reg FD and one without it.  In either world, 
sophisticated portfolio traders will attempt to assemble, 
balance, and liquidate pieces of their portfolios outside of the 
periods that take place after information begins to be released 
(whether piecemeal or to the entire market).  After all, those 
periods are associated with heightened IA costs—whether 
slightly heightened (in the case of piecemeal releases)128 or 
markedly heightened (in the case of simultaneous ones).129  
When successful at doing so, they avoid trading in those 
high-cost stretches.  It follows that in a world in which tiered 
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dissemination of corporate disclosures is allowed with no 
limit on the duration of the early release, these savvy traders 
will try to detect the asymmetries and avoid trading during 
the periods.  Likewise, in the current world, they will try to do 
the same with respect to the brief post-release danger zones 
to which Reg FD gives rise. 
Crucially, however, it is almost certainly easier to detect a 
brief burst of Reg FD post-release information asymmetry 
than a prolonged muted post-(tiered) release one.  In the Reg 
FD world, firms are releasing their information at one point in 
time to the public, rather than disseminating it piecemeal to 
select market participants over the course of hours, days, and 
even weeks.  Firms have little incentive to keep mum about 
such a full release of information, yet much incentive to stay 
quiet about piecemeal ones.  The latter allows the select 
groups that received the information to earn larger profits 
from it, which, if you gave someone an early look at valuable 
information, you might want to allow.  In short, there is more 
transparency associated with full releases of information than 
piecemeal ones.  Although no law requires such notice, it is 
thus more likely that firms will make the timing of those 
public releases—as opposed to ones to select groups of 
information traders—widely known ahead of time.  Thus, as a 
matter of theory, Reg FD leaves the ordinary investors who 
engage in portfolio trading that seeks to detect and avoid the 
moments after information is released better off with respect 
to IA costs. 
Still, it is important to emphasize a few caveats about 
this theoretical Reg FD aid to ordinary investors.  First, as 
with the benefit to those who use limit orders to avoid brief 
Reg FD bursts of information asymmetry, the one discussed 
here does not seem to have driven regulatory action in the 
area.  Second, Reg FD (and current IDL more broadly) 
contains no notice provision with respect to the release of 
new information.  Instead, it merely requires corporations to 
make information available to everyone when they first 
release it beyond the firm.  As a result, even these traders’ 
ability to predict the timing of Reg FD danger zones is far 
from perfect.  So, while some ordinary investors may be able 
to benefit by moving their relatively non-time-sensitive 
trading outside these post-release danger zones, most will no 
doubt find themselves blindsided by them from time to time 
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as the stream of new information flows to the market without 
any notice whatsoever.130  Lastly, this particular Reg FD boon 
to ordinary investors is only available to those who engage in 
efforts to detect information asymmetries in the market.  
Many ordinary investors—such as those Group #1 investors 
who seek to avoid IA costs through the use of conservative 
limit orders—either find such efforts unprofitable or lack the 
sophistication to use them effectively. 
Still, the result for these Group #2 investors is quite 
different when it comes to the effect of the NYAG initiative.  
Sophisticated traders who benefit from portfolio trading that 
detects and avoids the moments after information release will 
be unaffected by that “investor protection” work.  They will be 
just as likely to be able to detect the impending 
two-second-early release of informational products at 
9:59:58 a.m. as they are to be able to detect a simultaneous 
public release of the same two seconds later at 10:00 a.m. 
sharp.  There is no reason to believe that those seconds-early 
releases were any easier or harder to detect than today’s 
perfectly simultaneous ones.  The same principle applies to 
the SEC initiative relating to the seconds- and minutes-early 
releases of corporate filings.131  Thus, those recent campaigns 
likely leave Group #2 investors no better or worse off. 
In sum, as a matter of theory, Reg FD leaves some 
fortunate Group #2 ordinary investors better off—even if their 
avoidance and detection abilities are limited and such 
 
 130 Professional liquidity providers engage in similar detection and avoidance 
techniques. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  But, they are better 
positioned than even sophisticated ordinary investors to do so.  Once again, 
reading the news is not part of their business.  See supra note 99 and 
accompanying text.  Instead, they learn information from the flow of buy and 
sell orders sent their way.  To mitigate their losses to those who do focus their 
business on digesting news, they design algorithms that detect the type of 
abnormal trading activity associated with information trading.  For instance, a 
flurry of buy orders may suggest to liquidity providers that their prices are too 
low.  In response, the algorithm dictates that they will not just increase their 
valuation of the stock, but also that they should consider quoting inferior prices 
around it for as little as a second or so until the market returns to its more 
normal two-sided flow of incoming buy and sell orders.  See supra notes 100–
102 and accompanying text.  Thus, they are able to indirectly detect and avoid 
many post-release dangers in a way in which even savvy portfolio traders are 
less likely able to. 
 131 Interestingly, to the extent that Reg FD stops mere seconds- and 
minutes-early releases (or perhaps even hours-early ones), the result is more or 
less the same: little to no benefit for even these Group #2 investors.  This means 
that it is only Reg FD’s preclusion of larger-scale practices of tiered 
dissemination that helps these investors. 
HAEBERLE & HENDERSON INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 
158 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.101:PPP 
avoidance and detection was not foreseen when promulgating 
the regulation.  And mere seconds- and minutes-early 
simultaneity efforts like those embodied by more recent work 
by the NYAG and SEC make little difference for even these 
fortunate ordinary investors. 
However, all of these legal efforts have yet another (and 
here perverse) previously unidentified effect on ordinary 
investors.  This effect is specific to our third and final group 
of ordinary investors, which we turn to next.  And it includes 
both an effect on ordinary-investor IA costs and their general 
wellbeing more broadly. 
3. Group #3: Ordinary Investors Who Are Duped into 
Portfolio Trading or Noise Trading in the Moments After 
Information Releases 
Many ordinary investors intentionally engage in their 
direct trading through retail-level brokerage accounts in the 
moments after market-moving information is released.  These 
individuals generally lack institutional-level resources and 
sophistication.  It is thus these investors who are most 
vulnerable to the unfairness about which policymakers have 
long been so concerned in the IDL area as well as the 
securities context more generally.132  Yet, for two reasons, 
both Reg FD and the related efforts from the past few years 
likely increase the size of this third group of ordinary 
investors.  The end result is both an increase in the amount 
of IA costs incurred by these individuals, as well as a more 
general decrease to their wellbeing.133 
All of the equal-timing mandates under examination 
promote a misunderstanding that likely has an important 
negative effect on many individual investors.  The 
misunderstanding is that the law has evened the playing field 
between them and sophisticated information traders when it 
comes to trading based on the information in market-moving 
disclosures and the like.  The misunderstanding is, well, 
understandable: the playing-field-is-leveled message is the 
 
 132 See supra section II.A. 
 133 A good number of the 11,000-plus investment funds in the United States 
no doubt act in the same way when trading on behalf of ordinary investors.  See 
Delevingne, supra note 87 (noting the number of funds in the United states).  
However, for the sake of brevity, and because the policymaker concern for 
ordinary investors that motivates simultaneity efforts focuses so much on these 
direct-trading individual investors, we focus only on the latter here. 
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precise one that regulators sought to deliver and are 
delivering.  Regulators told these investors that they were 
now on equal footing with all other market participants when 
it came to first access to this information.134 
But the result of this perhaps technically accurate, yet 
substantively misleading, message is perverse, as adherence 
to this mythical view of securities markets leads many of 
these investors to conduct their portfolio trading in the 
moments just after firms and other entities disseminate new 
information.  It is in those very moments in which these 
individuals are most susceptible to the information 
asymmetry that imposes costs on them.  So, 
simultaneous-dissemination requirements increase IA costs 
for the many ordinary investors in this group by duping them 
into conducting their portfolio trading in post-release danger 
zones. 
But the problem here is even larger than that presented 
by simply the increased IA costs in focus thus far.  All three 
of the requirements examined here encourage these same 
individuals to depart from the rational world of portfolio 
trading, and to enter the irrational one of noise trading.  Once 
again, rules requiring that new information be made available 
to all investors at the same exact time when first revealed 
beyond the firm or the like reinforce the view that there is a 
level playing field among various trader types when it comes 
to the ability to procure, analyze, and trade on newly 
announced information.  This view is largely erroneous. 
Few individuals can simply flip a switch and become 
successful information traders.  In fact, even the intermediary 
funds through which so many ordinary individuals invest 
would be hard pressed to compete as information traders 
with respect to this specific type of information.  Corporate 
disclosures and similar informational products are often 
simply announcements of valuable information (e.g., the 
financial statement in the 10-Q states that earnings came in 
at $2.00 per share, thus beating market estimates by $1.00 
per share).  That information often has a fairly clear 
consensus import for the market prices (e.g., those prices 
likely undervalue the company by $0.10 per share).  In at 
least today’s world of highly evolved electronic trading, it is 
likely that only one specific type of information trader is able 
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to profit on the basis of the release of such 
computer-readable information.  That trader is the 
high-speed announcement trader.135  And there are rumored 
to be only two dozen or so of these speedsters.  So, when 
information producers disseminate their material information 
to the public in compliance with current law by releasing it to 
all market participants at the exact same time, it is often only 
these ones who are able to profitably trade on it right away. 
But even if direct-trading individuals could compete on 
speed, they would likely be better off by following a 
buy-and-hold strategy of portfolio diversification.  This is one 
of the central implications of the two pillars of modern 
corporate finance: Modern Portfolio Theory and the Efficient 
Capital Markets Hypothesis.136  And the lesson that arises out 
of them pertains to almost all investors who fall outside a 
group consisting of professionals whose primary business is 
making information-based trades in the stock market.  Thus, 
whether or not the information at issue is computer-readable 
and profitable for only a handful of highly sophisticated 
traders, leaving the world of portfolio trading to attempt to 
compete with professional information traders on the analysis 
of newly disclosed information is, at best, ill-advised for 
individual investors.  Yet the way in which the law regulates 
the dissemination of market-moving information today 
paradoxically encourages just that behavior. 
In sum, those ordinary investors who—emboldened by 
equal-timing requirements—intentionally conduct their direct 
trading as portfolio traders or noise traders in post-release 
danger zones are harmed by those requirements.  And the 
policymakers behind these laws who primarily sought to help 
ordinary investors should find those results disconcerting.  
After all, it is these individuals who are most susceptible to 
the costs associated with a market in which some 
participants will inevitably be better informed than others, 
and it is also these individuals who often sit precariously on 
the line that divides those who engage in portfolio trading 
that generally enhances their welfare from those who engage 
in noise trading that generally erodes it. 
* * * 
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This Part has demonstrated a simple truth: the actual 
effects of Reg FD and related efforts on ordinary investors are 
far more complicated than simple policymaker statements 
about their allegedly beneficial effects on them reflect.  More 
specifically, the nuanced analysis presented here has shown 
what fairness-inspired simultaneity efforts actually do to the 
trading environment around the times at which the 
information is announced to the market—and, ultimately, 
what that means for the investors who are alleged to be the 
principal beneficiaries of them.  Remarkably, if enough 
ordinary-investor trading takes place in the moments after 
new information is released, then Reg FD’s equal-access 
regulation is actually making market participation less 
profitable for these investors despite the attempt to improve 
their lot.  At the end of the day, though, the relative size of 
ordinary-investor trading that takes place in brief Reg FD 
post-release danger zones versus the amount that benefits 
from trading in sustained Reg FD pre-release periods in 
which there are slightly lower information asymmetries than 
there would otherwise be is an empirical question that sits far 
beyond the scope of this study.  At present, it is safe to say 
that there is no basis for concluding that the net of the effects 
of Reg FD on ordinary investors is significantly positive.  
Likewise, the negative effect of Reg FD on vulnerable ordinary 
investors is, without any dispute, out of line with regulator 
intentions to improve their experience as market participants.  
Moreover, that harm presented to those ordinary investors 
alone may very well outweigh any of the other theoretical 
gains we have identified. 
All the while, there is strong reason to conclude that the 
net of the effects of related prohibitions on much more 
circumscribed earlier releases from the past few years 
provides no benefit to ordinary investors whatsoever.  From at 
least the standpoint of market-microstructure economics, the 
NYAG action is worthless for these investors.  In fact, 
however, from a broader perspective, it is likely worse than 
worthless, in that it no doubt leads to a misimpression about 
the market among at least direct-trading individuals, and 
thus encourages them to conduct their portfolio trading at 
the wrong times, and perhaps even worse, to become noise 
traders.  Of course, the elimination of longer early-release 
periods better measured in minutes than seconds by the SEC 
as a result of its cleanup of the EDGAR system has an impact 
closer to that of Reg FD.  But because, when disregarding 
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outliers, it at the high end eliminated only early releases of 
about a few minutes, its ultimate impact has the same basic 
features of the NYAG action. 
Still, the magnitude of each of the negative and positive 
effects of these simultaneous-dissemination requirements has 
not been evidenced in any empirical study with which we are 
familiar.  That is not surprising.  We believe this work is the 
first to identify them.  But it is safe to say the following: 
regulators have no more basis to claim that the simultaneity 
mandates that define IDL today improve ordinary-investor 
welfare than we have to claim the opposite.  Yet, that defining 
feature of IDL has been trumpeted and expanded in recent 
years.  And in the next and final Part, we show that our 
analysis here gives rise to a simple inference: there are a 
number of ways in which IDL could be formulated to 
definitively achieve its stated ends—all without the need for 
any equal-timing whatsoever. 
IV 
REFORMING IDL WITH AN EYE ON ITS PRINCIPAL STATED GOAL 
Simultaneous-dissemination requirements were primarily 
set up to make participation in the stock market fairer for 
ordinary investors.137  Yet, our analysis in Part III suggests 
that—at a minimum—they present no obvious net benefit to 
those investors.  In fact, it demonstrates that some of these 
requirements harm at least direct-trading individual investors 
in a perverse manner.  But our discussion so far also makes 
something else clear: ordinary investors would be left 
unequivocally better off if regulation helped them detect and 
avoid the IA costs associated with the trading environment 
after information is first released.  It also makes clear that 
they would be left better off if regulators, at a minimum, did 
not indulge in mythology relating to the ability of 
direct-trading individuals to compete as successful 
information traders.  So laws that help investors avoid the 
costs associated with information release would boost their 
wellbeing leaps and bounds beyond whatever is accomplished 
by the current bright-line equal-timing requirements found in 
the law—no matter how rhetorically pleasing they and their 
equal opportunities sound.  For that reason, in this final Part, 
we set forth a series of reforms to show the following: even if 
 
 137 See supra Introduction; supra Part I. 
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the regulators who set forth the requirements for equally 
timed information releases that must happen today did in 
fact somehow stumble upon some net benefit to ordinary 
investors, the chief goal that drives those requirements can 
be far better achieved through more creative uses of IDL. 
A. Disclosure of Disclosure 
Today, no law restricts public companies and similar 
information producers from releasing their information when 
they please, without any advanced notice to the public 
whatsoever.  For this reason, even savvy ordinary investors 
no doubt find themselves harmed by post-release information 
asymmetries with some frequency.138  Yet, IDL could contain 
a simple notice requirement that would help these investors 
avoid those asymmetries—thereby leaving ordinary investors 
far better off than they are today. 
The exact proposal?  Require information producers to 
announce their intention to release any information that 
stands a decent chance of moving markets, and to do so well 
before making that release.  The law could take a first step 
along these lines by requiring public firms to make these 
types of disclosures in order to inform the market as to when 
they are releasing their required disclosures to the market.  
We thus refer to this proposal as one for “disclosure of 
disclosure.” 
In an information-dissemination regime with this type of 
notice feature, at least savvy portfolio traders could plan the 
timing of their generally non-time-sensitive trading based on 
their new knowledge as to when information will be shared.  
They would thus exit the market from whenever new 
information was set to be released until the point in time at 
which the information was thought to be incorporated into 
market prices.  Even many not-so-savvy everyday individuals 
who trade directly through retail-level brokerage accounts 
would be able to do the same—especially if the law required 
explicit notice to them through, for example, a warning 
delivered through their online brokerage account that popped 
up before their orders could be submitted to the market. 
Although we focus on disclosure of public-company 
disclosures as a first step, it bears emphasizing that this 
reform could be used to protect ordinary investors with 
 
 138 See supra section III.B.2. 
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respect to the dissemination of far more than simply that type 
of information.  There is no reason why regulators could not 
apply the concept to the revelation of the information targeted 
by the NYAG that is produced by universities, trade 
associations, and other entities—to the extent that they do 
not already provide notice on their own accord.  Likewise, it is 
difficult to see why various government entities that fail to 
provide this type of advance notice of important information 
releases should not be included among the list of information 
producers that must inform the market as to their 
information-release plans—if the goal of protecting ordinary 
investors does in fact dominate other considerations.  Like 
the lack of notice associated with corporate disclosure today, 
no law requires the producers of this other important 
information to alert the market as to their 
information-dissemination plans.  Consequently, requiring 
this type of notice to the market would not only better protect 
ordinary investors from the information asymmetries 
associated with the release of the information targeted by Reg 
FD and related recent simultaneity efforts, but it would also 
contain the potential to protect them from a far wider range of 
those asymmetries. 
To be sure, without some upward limit on the amount of 
time in which new information could be dripped out to the 
market, any of these types of disclosure-of-disclosure 
changes may prove of limited use to portfolio traders that are 
trying to avoid dangerous post-release trading environments.  
After all, if the information producer leaked the information 
into the marketplace over a matter of days or weeks starting 
at noon on Wednesday, our notice that new information will 
begin coming out then might do ordinary investors little good.  
This is because the select traders with first access to the 
information might be able to at least tacitly agree to trade 
slowly under the radar so that their informational advantage 
might last over a sustained period. 
Moreover, the mere announcement that market-moving 
information will be on its way soon (e.g., in two hours at 
noon) may create a loosely related problem: an increase in IA 
costs imposed on ordinary investors between the 
announcement time (10:00 a.m.) and the first release (noon) 
alone.  The end result would be an extension of the length of 
the problematic window of information asymmetry to include 
that time period. 
Lastly, with respect to public-company disclosure, there 
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would also undoubtedly be instances in which the release of 
one company’s disclosure would have implications for 
information asymmetries relating to other companies’ stock.  
Indeed, the existence of those instances might be even more 
common than their absence. 
The law could address all of these concerns without 
defaulting to an insistence on simultaneity.  For example, the 
law could merely add an “information-dissemination shot 
clock” like the one we discuss below to ensure that the 
post-release information asymmetries were contained to an 
easily avoidable period of time.  And it could rely on savvy 
portfolio traders’ understanding, for example, that the 
expectation of new information from Apple from noon to 2:00 
p.m. means that they should stay away from the market for 
Samsung during those two hours as well.  But because of 
these concerns with mere disclosure of disclosure, if the law 
is to go down this road of reforming IDL along these lines to 
ensure that it actually furthers its primary stated goals, it 
should prefer a more robust reform to IDL—like the one we 
discuss next. 
B. Set Information-Release Windows with an 
Information-Dissemination Shot Clock 
A second, larger reform would be to build on the 
protections associated with disclosure of disclosure.  There 
are many ways in which regulators could do so.  Here we 
discuss the broad contours of one such way: 
requiring set information-release windows with an 
information-dissemination shot clock. 
This reform would involve a requirement that the release 
of information occur within circumscribed windows set out in 
a transparent manner well ahead of time.  This 
farther-reaching change to IDL would provide portfolio 
traders with notice of likely periods of high information 
asymmetry, just as disclosure of disclosure would. 
To emphasize the point, the duration of the set 
information windows in which information could be released 
to the market would have to be capped for the reform to carry 
out its full potential.  We refer to such a time-restriction 
provision as a “dissemination shot clock.”  This shot clock 
would give information producers a set amount of time to 
complete their dissemination of new information, from initial 
selective revelation beyond the firm or the like to the time at 
which the information is made available to the public more 
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generally.  Unaccompanied by such a restriction, entities 
might reveal information piecemeal over long periods—leaving 
portfolio traders unable to identify exactly when within those 
periods they will be prone to significantly heightened IA costs.  
In fact, if the information revelation was dribbled out to the 
market slowly enough, and the trading based on that dribble 
undiscernible enough, portfolio traders might have to avoid 
the market long enough to impede even their generally 
non-time-sensitive trading goals. 
Of course, the clock may be set for as little as a second or 
two, as was done by the market in the University of Michigan 
example.139  But the clock could also be set for a much longer 
duration, perhaps up to a day or more.  The University of 
Michigan and select information traders may very well have 
come up with such an arrangement on their own if not for the 
fear of regulatory action or related public-perception issues.  
Whether or not the law should allow such a long shot 
clock given how information asymmetries could be hidden 
within the release period is a different question.  But it is 
worth noting that even day-long maximum duration may do 
the trick.  In fact, if the shot clock were set toward the longer 
end of the spectrum, portfolio traders might even be able to 
safely enter the market toward the middle or end of the 
dissemination window.  This is because one can assume that 
information asymmetries would be greatly reduced by then, 
after the first information traders to receive the information 
transact fast and furiously in the early part of the 
tiered-release window, knowing of their circumscribed 
early-release advantage.140 
Whether set for a second or a day, with information 
revelation restricted to a relatively short, well-defined, and 
transparent window along these lines, ordinary investors and 
those trading on their behalf with notice as to when that time 
began and ended could temporarily exit the market.  That exit 
would allow them—at minimum private costs—to avoid much 
of the IA costs associated with information release.  They 
could then return to the market to complete their portfolio 
trading as they please. 
 
 139 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (explaining why 
information traders aim to buy and sell quickly when they anticipate 
competition and the informational advantage ending within a small time 
period). 
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Moreover, this second reform would also curtail those 
periods in a manner that helps ameliorate all of the issues on 
which we touched with respect to mere disclosure of 
disclosure alone.  The set windows we envision would be for 
all information producers.  Those market-wide windows could 
be part of the structure of stock trading at all exchanges and 
off-exchange trading venues.  For example, they could be but 
a minute long, and positioned as frequently as on the hour 
every hour during the heart of the regular trading day.  That 
type of set, transparent information-release window would 
leave the beginning and end of regular trading unchanged 
while also avoiding the effects of any idiosyncrasies 
associated with the opening and closing of the trading day.  
Or, the window could be set for all covered information 
producers for one hour each Wednesday, smack in middle of 
the trading week—thereby accomplishing much of the same, 
albeit perhaps with less disturbance of regular trading than 
that associated with even mere minute-long releases at the 
top of all midday trading hours.  Or, lastly, the start times 
could even be set for after regular trading hours. 
Likewise, the chances of information that is relevant for 
the trading environment associated with any given stock 
being released are still small.  This means that the extent of 
any pre-window information asymmetry would be greatly 
mitigated.  Thus, the scheduling of, for example, set 
minute-long information-release windows at the start of each 
trading hour, would be far less likely to result in any 
significant buildup of information asymmetry toward the end 
of each hour as would one-off announcements associated 
with disclosure of disclosure alone. 
Lastly, the temporary, protective retreats we envision 
would likely be market-wide given that all new 
market-moving information (and not just one firm’s) would 
have to be released in these set windows.  This would 
eliminate the Apple-news-has-relevance-to-Samsung-stock 
problem, as portfolio traders would no longer have that type 
of challenge with respect to trying to determine just how 
widespread their withdrawal from the market should be when 
any one individual source of information is released. 
Of course, if having these set windows of information 
release at the top of each midday trading hour (or even once a 
day for a few minutes at noon) is too disruptive for 
ordinary-investor wellbeing or trading more generally, then 
the frequency of those windows could be limited to as little 
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as, for example, one time per week for all information 
producers.  Such an information-release window could take 
place each Wednesday from noon to 1:00.  While this type of 
interval may at first glance appear problematic for the flow of 
information from information producers to the public, the 
main benefits to which that flow is thought to lead (the 
improved capital allocation and corporate governance 
associated with more accurate stock pricing)141 are unlikely to 
require prices with more and better information each and 
every day.  Indeed, the main law aimed at enhancing price 
accuracy in order to improve those ends 
(mandatory-disclosure law) only requires firms to make 
far-ranging disclosures on their prospects on a periodic basis 
more easily measured in fiscal quarters than days.142  
Moreover, the law could of course make an exception for the 
release of urgent information, with administrative censure 
perhaps being enough to ensure that such an 
exceptional-circumstances caveat would not be abused. 
Thus, instituting set information-release windows with a 
maximum information-dissemination shot clock represents a 
second, broader way in which IDL could be shaped to leave 
ordinary investors far better off than they are today.  All the 
while, no law requiring information to be made available to all 
market participants at the exact same time would be 
necessary.  Nor would any additional examination of the 
nuanced and hard-to-quantify effects of Reg FD and the 
related recent efforts on ordinary investors—which presently 
are far from clear and open to substantial critique. 
* * * 
This final Part demonstrated that IDL can be shaped to 
help ordinary investors in a manner far beyond whatever is 
accomplished by its current one-dimensional focus on 
simultaneity.  Specifically, it has presented examples of 
reforms to this emerging area of the law that would result in 
unambiguous, material improvements to ordinary-investor 
wellbeing.  Thus, it offered changes to the way in which the 
revelation of market-moving information is regulated that 
would better meet the primary policymaker goal in the area 
than the current unimaginative approach that centers on 
 
 141 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 142 The United States is a periodic-disclosure jurisdiction, meaning firms are 
not required to disclose all compelled information as they learn of it on any kind 
of continuous basis, but only in an “ongoing, periodic” manner. 
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equally timed dissemination to all.  And given that there is 
little basis for concluding that the current regime and its 
central attribute do much—if anything—toward that end, the 
ideas for change should have considerable appeal for 
policymakers. 
Of paramount importance, however, whether or not these 
reforms are welfare enhancing for society, as opposed to just 
one subset of the investing community, is something we have 
not analyzed.  Instead, we have taken the law and 
policymakers on their own terms—attempting to restrict our 
focus to the relatively narrow set of issues relating to the 
primary stated goal in each of the simultaneity initiatives in 
focus here.  We must therefore caution against irrational 
exuberance toward our proposals.  After all, our proposals no 
doubt have costs.  Whether the ordinary-investor benefits to 
which they lead outweigh those costs is a distinct issue to the 
ones addressed in Parts III (whether the defining feature of 
IDL today enhances ordinary-investor welfare at all) and IV 
(whether IDL can be shaped in a manner that would 
unambiguously achieve that end). 
What are the main costs of the proposals? 
For one thing, by protecting ordinary investors, proposals 
like the ones described here take away profits from 
information traders—thereby reducing the incentive to engage 
in price-correcting work on the part of the latter.  The result 
of implementing the proposals without safeguards for the 
production of accurate stock prices might therefore be 
undesirable. 
For another, perhaps perceptions matter more than 
reality, and if implemented without still requiring 
simultaneity, our proposals would result in harms associated 
with perceptions of unfairness.  The feeling—in and of itself—
of unfairness associated with a major institution in society 
involving unequal access to information represents a social 
harm.  Moreover, that social harm might be especially acute 
when the perceived unfairness involves the perception of 
unevenness between a group of individuals within the top 1% 
of wealth in society (here, the individuals whose money 
stands behind information traders) and a group of individuals 
with more varied financial net worths.  Additionally, the costs 
associated with any lower levels of ordinary-investor 
confidence in the market that arose out of the perception 
might lead to lower levels of ordinary-investor participation in 
the market.  The costs of such reduced investment can be 
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quite serious, including illiquidity, a higher cost of capital for 
firms, and a lower level of stock-price accuracy. 
We scratch the surface on these considerable concerns 
here merely to ensure caution among regulators when 
pursuing reforms to IDL.  But given these considerable 
concerns with even reforms to IDL that unambiguously 
improve ordinary-investor wellbeing, we therefore step back 
to gain perspective and ask what are perhaps the most 
important questions of all those asked thus far: Should IDL 
even be used in order to help ordinary investors?  And, is its 
present form fine—albeit for all the wrong reasons, if you take 
policymakers at their word with respect to the primary 
rationale behind simultaneity today? 
Answering this and related questions would require a 
good amount of further study.  But as we approach our 
concluding thoughts, we note merely the following three 
broad points. First, we have discerned an emerging area of 
securities law that we believe is analytically distinct from the 
areas in which it has been lumped (securities-disclosure law 
when it comes to Reg FD, and insider-trading law it comes to 
at least the NYAG effort).  Second, that the area’s defining 
feature today has an ambiguous and difficult-to-quantify 
effect on ordinary-investor wellbeing despite its main stated 
end.  Third, the area can easily be shaped to far better 
achieve that end, for example, by pursuing the types of 
reforms we introduced here.  We have also added caution into 
the mix due to larger considerations of securities law—
namely, those relating to stock-price accuracy and (even 
false) perceptions of ordinary-investor danger.  But we would 
be remiss in not bringing up one final intriguing issue 
presented by these findings: can this area of law that has 
been to date thought of only as a one-trick pony be developed 
in a creative way to improve ordinary-investor wellbeing, 
stock-price accuracy, and perceptions of fairness all at the 
same time?  In addition to taking note of what our journey in 
this paper has revealed in more detail, we touch on this 
question and the potential for IDL to be shaped in such a 
manner to improve securities law on the whole in the 
Conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the market-moving information around 
which modern federal securities law has long revolved, 
policymakers and those to whom they appeal have often 
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suffered from a blind devotion to fairness-inspired legal 
interventions.  The extent to which the foundation of that 
body of law (mandatory-disclosure law) and its two main 
overlays (securities-fraud law and insider-trading law) are in 
fact justified on fairness grounds has been hotly debated.  Yet 
despite the controversy, the faith has remained unquestioned 
when it comes to the newest addition to this disclosure-based 
area of the law—an area that we have named 
information-dissemination law. 
In this Article, we questioned important securities laws 
and the reasoning behind them, taking a first step toward 
better understanding them.  More specifically, we reviewed a 
series of regulatory initiatives that have been thus far treated 
as discrete.  Stepping back to view them together, however, 
we asserted that the efforts were all representative of an 
emerging area of law.  And we pointed out that the defining 
feature of that area today is found in the requirement that 
market-moving information must be made available to all 
investors at the same exact time when first revealed. 
But, as shown in the Article, the assumption that the 
protection of ordinary investors compels the dissemination of 
such valuable information to all at once is not supported by 
the reality of interactions in the stock market today.  
Moreover, the monolithic focus on simultaneity in IDL has 
eclipsed the identification of a broader set of issues relating to 
how the revelation of this important information should be 
regulated, thereby blocking policymakers from even noticing 
that there is an area of law here with fascinating potential 
uses. 
More specifically, we detailed how the hallmark of IDL is 
simultaneity in the name of ordinary-investor fairness.  Yet 
we showed, as a matter of theory, that the effects of the main 
example of IDL (Reg FD) on ordinary investors are far from 
clear—and that the regulation perversely left the most 
vulnerable ordinary investors worse off.  We also explained 
why at least one related simultaneity effort from the past few 
years likely left ordinary investors worse off altogether. 
Given these findings, the Article presented new ideas for 
shaping IDL in order to unequivocally better achieve the 
primary regulator goal in the area.  Proposals based on our 
thinking, such as the two concrete ones we set forth, would 
without any doubt help everyday investors better avoid the 
dangers associated with the revelation of new information to 
the market.  After all, disclosure of disclosure would allow 
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them to steer clear of town when the slaughterhouse is open 
for business, and set information-release windows with 
information-dissemination shot clocks would do the same—
albeit with even broader protections. 
There are still of course other fairness-inspired reforms 
that are consistent with our thinking.  For example, whether 
in addition to one of the above reforms or on its own, there is 
something even more basic that the SEC could do that might 
be in and of itself more helpful than compelling the 
simultaneous release of information: provide ordinary 
investors with some simple information on how to protect 
themselves from a market that will be characterized by 
dangerous information asymmetries as new important 
information is being revealed.  More specifically, the SEC—
through its Office of Investor Education and Advocacy—could 
engage in an educational campaign.  The campaign we 
envision would encourage ordinary investors to participate in 
the stock market through sophisticated funds that simply 
index the market rather than on their own—although other 
creative similar alternatives on which we are less bullish exist 
too (e.g., those associated with educating individual investors 
on the use of beneficial trading techniques143).  The 
educational effort would thus likely both help reduce the 
extent to which these investors are harmed by the 
information asymmetries associated with the release of new 
information, and the extent to which they participate in the 
market as noise traders. 
But all of these ideas focused on protecting ordinary 
investors merely scratch the surface of IDL, as how society 
regulates the revelation of market-moving information has 
implications that emanate far beyond that one securities-law 
goal to affect current thinking about the ends of securities 
regulation on the whole. 
For one thing, the tenets established in this paper open 
the door to the intriguing question posed at the close of Part 
IV: Can this emerging area of the law be shaped in a manner 
that addresses concerns for ordinary-investor fairness, 
ordinary-investor perceptions of unfairness, and stock-price 
accuracy all at the same time?  Our inclination is that this 
question might be answered in the affirmative.  For example, 
 
 143 See supra section III.A.1 (discussing one such trading technique that can 
sometimes be used by portfolio traders in order to limit the IA costs they incur). 
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if tiered dissemination of new information is not necessary to 
achieve current levels of ordinary-investor wellbeing, then 
why not allow companies to sell early-access rights to their 
disclosures in a well-regulated market for early access to 
corporate disclosures?  If firms were able to sell early-access 
products with required disclosure of disclosure or within set 
information-release windows with information-dissemination 
shot clocks, then market forces could go to work in a manner 
that would provide them with powerful incentives to produce 
and share more robust disclosures than merely those 
required by mandatory-disclosure law today.  So, the market 
would get more of the information that it wants.  All the 
while, ordinary investors would be left far better off than they 
are today.  Likewise, so long as all information traders were 
able to access corporate disclosures equally at the time of 
their initial release, any Reg FD-style concern for the integrity 
and competitiveness of the price-discovery process144 may be 
largely muted. 
For another thing, thinking about IDL as an area of law 
that can be shaped to bring about a number of ends beyond 
mere enhanced fairness leads to an additional insight: IDL 
can be used to address more than even 
securities-law issues relating to the disclosure of information.  
For example, set information-release windows with 
an information-dissemination shot clock could help move 
insider-trading law forward.  Ordinary-investor fairness 
concerns have long animated policymaker action in that area 
of securities law as well—even if most scholarly 
commentators today believe there is no fairness issue 
whatsoever.  To the extent that fairness is an issue in that 
area, could it not be greatly reduced by implementing a 
simple requirement that insiders trading based on material, 
non-public information must do so during set windows—for 
example, from noon to 1:00 each trading day?  Of course, 
there are other concerns about allowing insiders to trade 
based on this information (namely ones for stock-price 
accuracy145).  Whether or not our information-release 
windows provide promise to address these concerns is an 
issue far beyond the scope of the current work.  But it is clear 
that those windows—at a minimum—would clean up the law 
 
 144 See supra section I.B.1.c. 
 145 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 53. 
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by removing much of the need (if any in the first place) to be 
concerned for the wellbeing of ordinary investors that results 
from insider trading.  Perhaps most importantly, such an 
approach might open up space for a clearer understanding as 
to why we have insider-trading law in the first place.  After 
all, if those windows take care of the ordinary-investor 
concern, the limits on insider trading would presumably have 
to be supported by consensus thinking on the practice’s 
harm to price accuracy or some other social good. 
We will stop there with respect to these ideas for 
reforming IDL to allow for a well-regulated market for early 
access to corporate disclosures or a better insider-trading 
regime.  The former part-regulatory-based, part-market-based 
framework for the dissemination of new information has 
price-accuracy (and other) positive implications that go well 
beyond the typical focus of regulators when it comes to the 
timing of information dissemination.  And the latter has the 
potential to address what has long been one of the most 
controversial issues in securities law.  But by introducing the 
ideas here, we further contextualize our criticisms of current 
IDL (namely, its current monolithic focus and lack of 
imagination).  And we open the door for thinking about how 
IDL can be crafted to better achieve the larger goals of the 
field—all the while without transferring wealth from, at a 
minimum, the most vulnerable ordinary investors to 
professional ones as it does today. 
To us, closing with these implications that go far beyond 
the effects of Reg FD and the like is a natural consequence of 
thinking about IDL as an area of securities law rather than a 
simple one-trick pony that works well in sound bites.  To be 
sure, we cannot say for certain that the implementation of 
some combination of one or more of our IDL proposals would 
provide a lower cost means of obtaining the current levels of 
ordinary-investor wellbeing.  We likewise cannot say for sure 
that any benefits relating to higher levels of ordinary-investor 
wellbeing would outweigh their costs.  Likewise, there has 
been no study to date of whether or not both 
ordinary-investor wellbeing and price accuracy would be 
materially improved if firms were allowed to sell their 
disclosures in a market for early access to corporate 
disclosures that incorporated the regulatory safeguards 
embodied in our thinking on IDL.  And implementing set 
insider-trading windows could have all sorts of negative 
effects on, for example, perceptions in a society where so 
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many object to the power and wealth of so few.  We leave the 
analysis of the desirability of at least wider changes to IDL 
and the considerable shift to the approach of modern 
securities regulation embodied in them to distinct study.  But 
we can say that we have opened the door to thoughtful and 
valuable innovation in an area of securities law 
(information-dissemination law) that has received little 
attention relative to the main mandatory-disclosure, 
securities-fraud, and insider-trading law focuses of the field. 
Two final concluding points bear mention.  First and 
foremost, it is important to emphasize the drawbacks of 
implementing our ordinary-investor-friendly proposals.  As we 
discussed at the close of Part IV, it is likely that our reforms 
have down sides.  For one thing, concerns relating to 
perceptions of unfairness alone might prove to be a 
recalcitrant enemy—no matter what the reality of the 
situation is.  For another, trade-offs associated with the 
incentive to produce information about firms’ prospects might 
be unavoidable when shaping IDL in a manner that protects 
ordinary investors from information asymmetries. 
Indeed, the latter concern alone raises an important 
conceptual point for the law.  If the status quo is preferable to 
our reforms because of a concern for the ability of 
information traders to earn profits from ordinary investors, 
then the law should be transparent about its intent.  The 
continuation of existing IDL should therefore be justified not 
based on what it does to protect ordinary investors, but 
rather based on how efficiently it guides lambs to the 
slaughterhouse to satisfy information-trading appetites—all 
in the name of price accuracy.  Ironically, despite all of the 
ordinary-investor rhetoric, the main clear advantage of an 
information-dissemination regime built on equally timed 
access to information over one built on disclosure of 
disclosure or the like is that the former is better for funding 
information traders.  So if the law opts to go with the status 
quo because of its importance to the price-discovery process 
despite the effects on ordinary investors identified here, a 
recognition of the truth of that conclusion among 
policymakers and commentators alone would represent an 
important step forward for the law in and of itself. 
Second, and lastly, on a broader level, our analysis 
provides yet another example in the growing pile of examples 
of securities-law works that recognize the realities of 
contemporary securities markets and differentiate between 
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different types of market participants.146  Taken together, 
these works and their incorporation of concepts from 
market-microstructure economics are providing a force that 
even the most entrenched ideas and government officials will 
not be able to resist.  That force is pushing in favor of 
recognizing that, despite conventional wisdom about 
irreconcilable differences and trade-offs among different types 
of market participants with different types of goals, those 
participants can prosperously co-exist in securities markets.  
Adding to this growing literature represents an important 
step forward for the law in and of itself.  Encouraging 
analysis of the law that is consistent with reality alone 
represents progress. 
 
 146 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. 
Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 196 
(2015) (describing a conceptual framework of stock market analysis based on 
“adverse selection, the principle-agent problem, and a multi-venue trading 
system”); Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 73; Haeberle, supra note 67, at 
122 (asserting that regulators can reform little-noticed stock-market rules to 
materially improve the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices); Haeberle, 
supra note 104; Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for 
Corporate Disclosure (U. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper 
No. 769, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814125 
[https://perma.cc/HXG5-2C37]. 
